COMMENTS
FAKE NEWS AND RACIAL, ETHNIC, AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES:
A PRECARIOUS QUEST FOR TRUTH
Kimberly Grambo
I. FAKE NEWS AND THE AGE OF THE INTERNET
The years following the 2016 American Presidential election forced a
reckoning with the role that misinformation played in our country’s
increasing political polarization. Today, consumers of online news media
are still confronted with a seemingly impossible task: mitigating the effects of
fake news without excessively burdening free speech. “Fake news” is an
inherently mischievous sub-genre of a broader category of misinformation.
Specifically, some psychologists and social scientists define it as one that
“mimics the output of the news media in form, but not in organizational
process or intent—e.g., lacking editorial norms and processes to weed out the
untrue in favor of the true.”1 As a result of several economic and
psychological qualities intrinsic to the dissemination of information online,
this new sub-genre of misinformation is powerful at shaping public opinion,
as the sensationalist rhetoric of the 2016 election evidenced.2
Fake news stories have not been limited to political topics, however.
From merely biased coverage to utter fabrications, a wide variety of
misinformation packaged as “news,” has impacted religious, ethnic, and
racial groups whose identities are wrapped up in our increasing national
polarization.3
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When the World Economic Forum convened in early 2017 to address
fake news, the conversation was not limited to electoral politics or insidious
foreign influence. It approached the issue as a more encompassing crisis of
global human rights, of which the threat to the democratic process is but one
part.4 When fake news stories spread false narratives about vulnerable
minority groups, an entirely different set of questions arises relating to the
balance between First Amendment rights and threats to public order.
Fake news that spreads misinformation about minority groups may be
construed as a form of group defamation, which many countries around the
world place within the reach of government oversight, sometimes even
through criminal law.5 Critically, the United States tends to shy away from
“hate speech laws,” as a concept, but in the context of fake news, culpability
stems less from contempt for the creator’s expressive intent and more from
its effect.6 Fake news that falsely and negatively portrays a particular ethnic,
racial, or religious group has the power to impute a “terrible criminality.”7
It implies an unworthiness of citizenship or even dehumanizes individual
members of those groups. History is littered with violent examples
demonstrating why society should aim to prevent these effects.
“Group defamation” laws of the type upheld by the Supreme Court in
Beauharnais v. Illinois8 have fallen out of favor in the United States since the
1950s, but several other countries have recently relied on similar laws to curb
the effects of non-political fake news. In response to fake news that has stirred
up animosity towards recently arrived immigrant populations, Germany
recently expanded its existing group defamation laws to include liability for
intermediaries such as Google and Facebook.9 In a more extreme example,
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amidst increased ethnic violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, political
leaders have been defending draconian defamation laws under the guise that
they are necessary to curb fake news relating to the violence.10
Though the American collective consciousness seems primarily focused
on the political ramifications of fake news, stories that inflict dignitary harm
on individual members of minority groups are also of great concern to the
national welfare. However, addressing non-political fake news would involve
novel First Amendment questions as to the public’s capacity to inoculate itself
against fake news in the absence of regulation and alternatively, the
government’s ability to properly administer a solution to the problem.
This Comment will assess multiple approaches to regulating non-political
fake news from a First Amendment perspective, with a passive approach
embracing gradual inoculation on one end of the spectrum, to an active
approach focused on criminal group libel at the other. However, ideology
and abstract legal doctrine alone do not necessarily point to the best answer
in practice, especially where it pertains to an outcome-oriented goal like the
protection of vulnerable minority groups from campaigns of hatred. The
lessons of the past and modern practical concerns indicate that even if legally
justifiable, active approaches are less-attractive solutions than passive ones.
Yet, this Comment ultimately concludes that neither approach is likely to
succeed absent public reckoning with the new values of a “post-truth”
America.
II. IDAHO AND THE DOMESTIC THREAT
In 2016, residents of Twin Falls, Idaho were invited via Facebook to join
an anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim rally in their small town. The event sought
to protest a “huge upsurge of violence towards American citizens” by Muslim
refugees settled there.11 Forty-eight Facebook users indicated that they were
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“interested” in attending.12 Four live humans, mobilized by fears for the
safety of their town, actually appeared.13 Yet the invitations, and the event
that they advertised, were fake. Not only did they originate from accounts
in Russia rather than from concerned neighbors in Idaho but, on a more
fundamental level, the march it advertised addressed a threat rooted in and
cultivated by fake news in and of itself.
As with many of the fake news articles that have circled American news
feeds, the story that instigated this debacle held a grain of truth, albeit a small
one.14 This grain of truth betrays a core tenet of fake news: it roots itself in
an existing rumor, partisan conflict or, as in this case, a brooding, fear-based
prejudice. In Twin Falls, the thread began with the government refugeeresettlement program and growing sentiment that the government was
prioritizing and protecting outsiders to the detriment of long-time residents
of the town.15 Then came reports and eventually charges of “lewd and
lascivious behavior” brought by local law enforcement against a five-yearold American child by seven- and ten-year-old Muslim immigrant boys in a
public laundry room. Fake news reports infected with xenophobic rhetoric
by anti-Islam websites like “Jihad Watch” began cropping up on social
media.16 By the time Breitbart News arrived on the scene, its reporter had
supposedly been sent to cover the “Islamic takeover” of the town by Syrian
refugees. The assault had been covered as a “horrific gang rape”
downplayed by local officials accused of being “Shariah supporters.”17 In
reality, New York Times journalist Caitlin Dickerson reported that no
Syrians had ever been resettled in Twin Falls, and police and parents had
swiftly and privately dealt with the original isolated incident in the laundry
room between three children.18
While the implication of foreign influence embedded in the origins of
anti-immigrant march invitations on Facebook is alarming, perhaps more
frightening is how effectively those fictional stories laid the foundation for the
fabricated rally to be taken seriously. Recently, fake news relating to the
“Migrant Caravan” of primarily Honduran asylum seekers traveling to the
Mexican-American border in October of 2018 exemplify how the overlay of
fake news can obfuscate our collective perception of an actual security
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threat.19 It is unclear the degree to which fake news informed the Trump
Administration’s unprecedented but largely unquestioned declaration that it
would send over 5,000 active-duty troops to support Customs and Border
Patrol in late November 2018.20 However, prior to the deployment, the
President had declared a “national emergency” at the border, but only after
retweeting several debunked news stories alleging that “Middle Eastern”
terrorists were among the caravan, which suggests that fake news may have
played some role in his assessment of the situation.21 Meanwhile, on-site
organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union lambasted the gross
qualitative and quantitative overestimation of the threat actually posed by
the caravan, declaring the decision to deploy military forces a “huge waste of
taxpayer money” that would only “further terrorize and militarize our
border communities.”22
Beyond what this episode says about the complexities of national security
under the current administration, a larger statement can be made about fake
news as a foundation for public manipulation. Particularly where targeted
misinformation seeks to demonize a segment of the population, these
episodes illustrate how quickly the transition from a digital mob to a real one
can occur.23
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Dissenting in Abrams v. United States, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
mused that governmental regulation of speech under the First Amendment
is “an experiment, as all life is an experiment.”24 Holmes radically envisioned
an evolving and responsive approach to speech, in acknowledgement that
some cases will test the comfort of the American people and the judiciary. In
line with that experimental approach, Holmes continued: “we should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we
loathe and believe to be fraught with death,” with the caveat of course,
“unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful
and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save
the country.”25 Holmes identified a tipping point of urgency, beyond which
government intervention through criminal sanction is not only justifiable, but
necessary. In 1919, when he wrote his famous dissent in Abrams, Holmes did
not believe that point had been surpassed when several Russian nationals
had distributed anti-capitalist pamphlets violating the Espionage Act.26
Given the unpredictable landscape of social news media today, it remains to
be seen whether fake news that foments animosity towards religious, ethnic,
or racial groups can and will “threaten immediate interference with the
lawful and pressing purposes of the law” that would justify a government
response from his foundational perspective.27 There is no better time to
revisit Holmes’ tipping point than today, amidst a technological and
informational revolution that presents equally unprecedented opportunities
for growth and devastation.
As of now, however, the Supreme Court seems relatively unconcerned
with “devastation,” and far more excited about “growth,” at least as it
pertains to freedom of speech online. In 2017, it made one of its first
pronouncements on the First Amendment implications of social media
regulation, in the case of Packingham v. North Carolina.28 “Today, one of the
most important places to exchange views is cyberspace, particularly social
media,” Justice Kennedy noted, before striking down a statute that would
have severely restricted access to social media sites by sexual predators.29
The opinion was openly hesitant to legislative restrictions on this new
frontier: “[T]he Court must exercise extreme caution before suggesting that
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the First Amendment provides scant protection for access to vast networks in
that medium,” Justice Kennedy warned, with five justices behind him.30
While he was addressing access to the internet more broadly, and not
constitutional protections for online content, Kennedy’s deferential
approach to a liberated internet is consistent with the Court’s trend over the
last century of preferring a free marketplace of ideas to a governmentregulated one. It indicates the Court’s strong position that the freedom of
the media online is highly valued.
This Comment will thus address the likelihood that the judiciary will
leave the fake news problem to information consumers to solve, while
keeping in mind that economic, sociological, and psychological
considerations of false content and online media are more complex than any
threat to the marketplace ever seen before. It will use the Court’s most recent
pronouncement regarding a passive approach to truth-seeking under the
First Amendment in United States v. Alvarez as a model for analysis.31 However,
given the unique character of fake news on social media, Alvarez’s passive
approach poses ideological and practical problems. Additionally, it raises
historically-rooted suspicions of government intervention in news media,
particularly when Holmes’ tipping point becomes a call for an “immediate
check” on dangerous speech.32
III. FALSE SPEECH IN AN UNFREE MARKETPLACE
While there may be little in the way of Supreme Court precedent
regarding social media law and the First Amendment as of yet, the courts
have often addressed the subject of false speech. Another idea put forth by
Justice Holmes in his Abrams dissent has shaped First Amendment
jurisprudence on “truth” in the last century, that “the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.”33 It is a useful maxim, in that it smartly excuses the courts from
having to wade into the murky waters of separating the true from the false in
discussions of First Amendment values. Underlying this statement, however,
is a questionable assumption: that each thought subject to the protection of
First Amendment protection “plays the market” fairly. In a complex
framework like social media, where algorithms and clicks guide competition
of ideas, the metaphor feels outdated. It exposes a dangerous flaw in a
30
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Id. Meanwhile, Justice Alito indicated his hesitance to extend unfettered protection in this area, in
contrast to the fervor of the majority: “The Court is unable to resist musings that seem to equate
the entirety of the internet with public streets and parks.” Id. at 1738 (Alito, J. concurring).
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id.
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“hands-off” approach to fake news and calls into question whether the
information consumer will be able to sort true from false news online without
intervention.
Despite being almost one hundred years old, the “marketplace of ideas”
justification for protecting false speech persists into the age of the internet.
More recently, the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in United States v. Alvarez
defended the merits of a general constitutional protection for false factual
statements, citing “the common understanding that some false statements are
inevitable if there is to be an open and vigorous expression of views in public
and private conversation, expression the First Amendment seeks to
guarantee.”34
In Alvarez, the Court reviewed under strict scrutiny whether the Stolen
Valor Act of 2005 was narrowly tailored enough to actually achieve a
compelling state interest in “protecting the integrity of the military honors
system.”35 This involved an analysis of the causal link between defendant
Alvarez’s admittedly false claim that he had won a medal of honor and the
subsequent dilution of the honor itself, and whether counter-speech might
also achieve the Act’s purpose.36 Critically, the Court attacked the
Government’s failure to show that unchallenged claims under the act
actually “undermine the public’s perception of the military and the integrity
of its awards system.”37 It also posited that a readily accessible database
(perhaps online) of recipients of the Medal of Honor would be a less
restrictive means of remedying the factual error.38 These two criticisms
reiterated the Court’s century-old belief that the marketplace of ideas would
and could correct itself as to Mr. Alvarez’s lie about the Medal of Honor, and
that government interference was unnecessary here.
Of course, the stakes in Alvarez were of a different magnitude than those
stemming from a worldwide epidemic of fake news and ethnic, racial, and
religious polarization. That is, fake news implicates a more complex ratio of
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Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 718 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964)). But see
Alan K. Chan & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment, 68 VAND. L.
REV. 1435, 1443 (2015) (“The Supreme Court has long suggested that ‘there is no such thing as a
false idea,’ premised on the notion that truth is optimally derived from free and open discourse,
including the rebuttal and challenge of even the most outrageous or ‘false’ ideas or beliefs.
Untruthful statements of fact are another matter, because they are said to neither advance public
discourse nor promote individual self-realization.” (footnotes omitted) (citing Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974)).
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 725.
Id.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 729.
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value to harm.39 In 1942, the Supreme Court, in deciding Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, delineated several categories of speech as “utterances [that] are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”40 While this list has
since evolved, false statements as a generalized category are still not
considered by the Supreme Court to be “low value” forms of speech
requiring policing. As such, the facts at issue in Alvarez allowed the Court to
easily sweep the plaintiff’s pointless lies into the bin of benign speech having
no value, but also no harm. Rather than correcting these statements through
legislation, the marketplace of ideas could take it from there; information
consumers could google Alvarez’s name and correct the lie, the medal of
honor would retain its integrity, and no further intervention would be
required.
Alvarez must be distinguished on two dimensions, however, when
assessing the appropriateness of the passive, marketplace of ideas approach
applied there as a solution to the fake news problem. First, for the purposes
of the Chaplinsky “value” assessment, news organizations occupy a special
place under the First Amendment, though there is yet no wholesale
exemption from liability for the media.41 This complex landscape should be
contrasted with the narrower inquiry relating to petitioner Mr. Alvarez as a
private individual lying for personal gain. The extent of the media privilege
is a nuanced one, with absolute protections for political criticism and from
prior restraint on one end of the spectrum, and the ever-shrinking but
39

40
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Id. at 717 (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)). In his majority opinion in
Alvarez, Justice Kennedy rejected the concept of a “free-floating test for First Amendment coverage”
based on “ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.” Id. at 717. Rather, he
acknowledged that certain content-based restrictions on speech may be allowed where they are
historically rooted, for example, the familiar categories of fighting words and obscenity. Id.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). The Chaplinsky list has evolved over the
years to include exceptions that the court had not yet considered in 1942, including fraud and child
pornography. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (holding that the First Amendment also protects
“commercial speech”). Subsequent refinements to the categorical approach as a framework aside,
(namely R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)) the conceptual evaluation was still relied on
by the court as of Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 717–18.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (“The need to avoid self-censorship by the
news media is, however, not the only societal value at issue. If it were, this Court would have
embraced long ago the view that publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and
indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation.”); cf. GRUNDGESETZ [GG I][BASIC LAW],
translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0026. In
Germany, “when cases present facts in which human dignity and free speech collide, free speech
usually must give way.” Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment:
Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity as A Preferred Constitutional Value in Germany, 78
TUL. L. REV. 1549, 1553–54 (2004). “The First Amendment, by way of contrast, makes no
provision for rights balancing; on its face, the right to free speech is absolute.” Id.
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persistent availability of malicious libel liability for defamation of non-public
figures on the other.42 Yet, the Court has repeatedly acknowledged the
unique danger restrictions on news organizations pose to society. Namely,
the expressive nature of publication and its democratic, truth-seeking,
discourse-stimulating value to information consumers is fundamental to the
American way of life.43
Second, Alvarez should be distinguished from the fake news inquiry in that
it was the first time that the court had addressed a measure that sought to
criminalize falsity alone without regard to the harm it causes. Kennedy is
careful to differentiate the facts in Alvarez from defamation, for example,
where there is other “legally cognizable harm associated with a false
statement.”44
Interestingly, despite that “false statements” are not on the list of
categorical, tradition-backed exceptions to full First Amendment protection
stemming from Chaplinsky, the narrower, common-law-rooted category of
defamation still appeared on Kennedy’s updated list in his 2012 Alvarez
opinion.45 The precarious relationship between defamation law and the
modern First Amendment will be discussed later in this analysis, particularly
the qualified nature of Kennedy’s reference to defamation as a category
receiving diminished constitutional protection.46 However, for the time
being, it suffices to forecast that the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the
marketplace of ideas as a justification for protecting false speech might be
inapplicable where that false speech attaches unique societal values, or is
particularly harmful.
Evaluation of a hands-off approach to fake news encapsulates precisely
that scenario: an intersection of “freedom of the press” values and harm to
the peace or to individuals or groups within society. The spread and effects
of fake news are predicated on a social platform that challenges many
42
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See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52 (“Every freeman has an undoubted
right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of
the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence
of his own temerity.”); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713–714 (1931) (claiming a statute
allowing public authorities to file suit against publishers for “defamatory matter” forms the “essence
of censorship”).
More specifically, while the court succinctly ponders the chilling effects of regulating private false
speech in Alvarez, chilling effects on news organizations may be particularly of issue for these
purposes. 567 U.S. at 716; see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340–42; Near, 283 U.S. at 713–15; N.Y. Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). These chilling effects and efforts to mitigate them
will be discussed further in Part III.
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 718–19.
Id. at 717.
Current reservations on the application of the categorical approach to defamation, such as
developments after New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), in libel law under the First
Amendment, will be discussed infra Part III.
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traditional assumptions about the way that the citizenry engages with new
information.47 These assumptions formed the basis for a theory of First
Amendment protection for false factual statements that may no longer apply.
Yet, on the other side, the Court’s fear of censoring or even chilling any
slightly less objectionable media (particularly online, as referenced in
Packingham) presents a compelling counterargument to government
intervention.48 In 2012, the Supreme Court confidently rejected the
Government’s attempts to criminalize false speech in Alvarez, again putting
its faith in the power of the marketplace of ideas. However, the unique
nature of the fake-news epidemic presents an altogether different case, both
in the value of the speech to society, and in the harm that it causes.49
A. The Value of Fake News
In contrast to the petty lies at issue in Alvarez, fake news stories defaming
minority groups can be more socially destructive, making reliance on the
corrective power of the marketplace of ideas more dubious. To illustrate, a
study of the most popular election articles in the three months leading up to
the 2016 United States presidential election found that the top twenty fake
news stories had more engagement (shares, reactions, and comments) on
Facebook than the top twenty articles from major news outlets.50 Beyond
highlighting the sheer magnitude of the problem, this study is telling for
several other reasons. It points to three unprecedented problems posed by
misinformation online, as distinct from traditional forms of news media.
First, the new incentive structures behind news production call into
question the heightened value that media has generally enjoyed as an
essential but rarefied outlet for informing the public. Second, fake news is as
resilient as “real” news and can compete in a social marketplace just as well.
Third, the least correctable fake news stories may also hold the greatest
potential to cause social harms. This section will explore ways in which
Holmes’ century-old justification for protecting false factual information fails
to address the challenges that arise when the digital revolution, human
psychology, and existing social tension meet.

47
48
49
50

See infra Part II.
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017) (“Foreclosing access to social media
altogether thus prevents users from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights”).
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 729–30.
Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories Outperformed Real News on
Facebook, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/viralfake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-onfacebook?utm_term=.uwmnD8LZw#.omoYGDJye.

1310

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:5

From the perspective of the First Amendment, the unique values ascribed
to the freedom of the press, as compared to the freedoms associated with
private speech, are changing rapidly as the lines between those two formerly
distinct categories blur. First Amendment scholar Eugene Volokh noted in
1995 that two of the underlying premises of the First Amendment—that to
speak and have a platform to do so was an investment, and that, as a result,
information consumers had a scarcity of information to consume—are
flipped in the age of the internet.51 These understandings were bound closely
to the conception of a free press having particular value in the marketplace
of ideas, based on the “natural right of the members of an organized society,
united for their common good, to impart and acquire information about
their common interest.”52 The value acknowledged here extends beyond the
mere assertion that the press enjoys particular freedom as the “fourth pillar”
of American democracy and more broadly to its vital function in uncovering
and disseminating truth to the public. Volokh’s early assertions about the
increased accessibility of public platforms mentioned above have arguably
stood the test of time. However, his subsequent prediction that the online
revolution would only strengthen the marketplace of ideas theory may not
have accounted for the distortive effects of social media, where anyone can
be (or pretend to be) a journalist in righteous pursuit of truth.
The creation and dissemination of fake news requires little to no
investment. Accordingly, the content in the marketplace of ideas is now
more than what a publisher deems worthy.53 In reducing the costs to
participate in journalism, traditional media with professional reporters,
advertising teams, and fact-checkers face dwindling profits, while “cheap
speech” creators (fake news “writers” among them) with startup costs
approaching zero conversely find that the business can be extremely
lucrative. “If the goal is to maximize an audience (and therefore ad revenue)
already facing a glut of down-the-middle serious news, then the trick is to
hype and promote any kind of row to get a huge influx of partisan readers,”
says James Ball in his 2017 book on fake news.54 “If a story is going to go
unchecked . . . why not make it up entirely and reduce costs even further?”55
51
52
53

54
55

Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1807 (1995).
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936).
See id. at 244–45, 249–50 (discussing the importance of attempts to lessen this bottleneck effect by
removing additional barriers like excess taxes, particularly on “cheap” newspapers available to the
masses); see also Alexander Smith & Vladimir Banic, Fake News: How a Partying Macedonian Teen Earns
Thousands Publishing Lies, NBC NEWS (Dec. 9 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/fakenews-how-partying-macedonian-teen-earns-thousands-publishing-lies-n692451 (featuring an
interview with a fake-news entrepreneur who notes that stories about Trump are his most
profitable).
JAMES BALL, POST-TRUTH: HOW BULLSHIT CONQUERED THE WORLD 11 (2017).
Id.
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The rise of the “attention industry,” and the growing importance of
advertising to the news business model means that some news content is now
created with a very different motivation than to inform the public and “seek
truth.”56 In the world of cheap speech and fake news, informational content
and educative effect are secondary concerns to profit margin.
On top of this, the injection of “social” components to our news-sharing
behaviors further complicates the values the publisher aims to maximize.
Media scholars Charlie Beckett and Mark Deuze have attempted to
understand modern journalism in the context of its “emotionally charged
networked environment,” and cite economic, technological and behavioral
factors pushing news media to change their approach to capturing audiences
through emotional appeal.57 They note that the precious craft of modern
news professionals is now “blended into people’s digital mobile lives
alongside kittens, shopping, sport, music, online dating and mating rituals,
pornography, and games,” which forces news operations to consider
entertainment value more than ever.58
This shift in focus has led to a body of psychological research into the
creation of “clickbait,” or the practice of styling online articles with titles
engineered to trigger an irresistible urge to click on them.59 A study through
Stanford University on the motivators of Facebook content creators revealed
that Facebook’s business model forces media sources to design content and
headlines to elicit readers’ emotional responses.60 Journalists surveyed
“contended that Facebook’s ad revenue business model emphasizes clickbait
over quality content and that profit off the spread of fake news will outweigh
incentives to effectively deal with the problem.”61 This is one of many
reasons why resorting to intermediary regulation of fake news is unlikely to
be widely supported among the tech companies that profit from fake news.62
More broadly, however, forms of fake news that exploit our emotional
responses for profit erode the traditional conception of journalism’s vital role
in the marketplace of ideas.
56

57
58
59

60
61
62

JACOB FINKEL ET AL., FAKE NEWS AND MISINFORMATION 113 (2017), https://wwwcdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Fake-News-Misinformation-FINALPDF.pdf.
Charlie Beckett & Mark Deuze, On the Role of Emotion in the Future of Journalism, SOCIAL MEDIA +
SOCIETY, July–Sept. 2016, at 1.
Id. at 2.
See An Emerging Science of Clickbait, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 25, 2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/536161/an-emerging-science-of-clickbait/ (noting a trend
whereby “[r]esearchers are teasing apart the complex set of links between the virality of a Web
story and the emotions it generates”).
FINKEL ET AL., supra note 56, at 33.
Id.
Id. at 88.
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Should the Supreme Court find itself presiding over a case involving fake
news and social media, however, it would not be the first time that economic
and entertainment value drivers have entered the judicial calculus. The
Court’s early evaluation of older forms of media is instructive as to how fake
news under the First Amendment may be treated. In short, where the
emotions of an audience are manipulated for profit, the degree of expressive
intent matters.
For example, in affirming an Ohio film-censorship law in 1915, the
Supreme Court in Mutual Film v. Ohio held that “The exhibition of moving
pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit,
like other spectacles, not to be regarded . . . as part of the press of the country,
or as organs of public opinion.”63 Films, although “vivid, useful and
entertaining,” were seen as being “capable of evil,” largely as a result of the
emotive quality of their imagery.64 Film as a medium was, of course,
eventually brought back under the governance of the First Amendment in
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, and remains there today from the modern
acknowledgement that it can “affect public attitudes and behavior in a
variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine
to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression.”65
Yet, critically, the Court did not go so far as to extend protection beyond the
point where “the capacity for evil” is exacted through film, instead suggesting
that while a prior restraint on these types of media would be inappropriate,
post-hoc controls might still be available where necessary.66
Consistent with that caveat, the Court has been less protective of forprofit private, but defamatory speech. The Supreme Court has previously
made pronouncements on defamatory speech that is made “solely in the
individual interest of the speaker and its specific business audience.”67 As it
related to erroneous credit reports, the Supreme Court in Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss approved of a defamation suit that did not relate to issues of
“public interest.”68 Accordingly, it did not raise quite the same expression63
64
65
66
67
68

Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915).
Id.
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
Id. at 502.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985).
Id. Whether or not fake news stories about groups relate to the public interest is another measure
entirely, though scholars have made arguments that group libel is akin to private libel of everyday
individuals, just on a different scale. WALDRON, supra note 5, at 127. Assuming that this type of
speech would not be found to be “public speech,” the majority in Greenmoss indicates that while
Gertz asserts that the state interest in public speech is “irrelevant,” for non-public speech, the state
interest may be taken into consideration in a defamation suit. Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 780 n.5 (1985)
(citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344–46 (1974). This distinction will be explored
further in Part III.
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quashing concerns associated with film censorship.69 The court refrained
from applying the full force of First Amendment scrutiny70 where speech was
both unlikely to be deterred by incidental state regulation because it is
motivated by profit, and where it was more “objectively verifiable” than
speech deserving of greater protection.71
Given the myriad forms of fake news, varying from easily debunked
clickbait (perhaps with solely economic incentives) to complex conspiracy
theories (written by authors who truly believe them), refusing First
Amendment protection for lack of clear informative or expressive purpose
would not be universally appropriate, if at all. For one, social scientists
studying fake news take care (albeit colloquially) to differentiate “bullshitters”
from “liars” in this context.72 While the latter cares deeply about the truth
and seeks to subvert it with some purpose, the former is simply unconcerned
with the truth—the “bullshit” created serves no purpose other than to
capture the reader’s attention.73 From expressive and protected films in
Joseph Burstyn, to entrepreneurial and unprotected credit reports in Dun &
Bradstreet, the craft of fake news “bullshitters” may fall closer to the latter.
This might further distinguish lying (and perhaps truly confused or deluded)
defendants like Alvarez from professional-grade fake news entrepreneurs.
These underlying motivations would be a consideration in some extreme
cases, for example, where “journalists” have openly admitted to creating and
soliciting highly deceptive content solely for attracting clicks and generating
advertising revenue.74
Volokh’s argument about lower barriers to entry and an increase in
content likewise disrupts the nature of “public discourse” as understood by
free-press absolutists, particularly in the context of fake news. Considering
the unique psychological mechanisms through which information about
other racial, religious, or ethnic groups is processed, the way information
consumers interact with content today challenges whether the assumptions
underlying Holmes’ “search for truth” even apply to social media.
Notably, the aforementioned statistic about how fake news fared as well
on social media as actual news, refers to “engagement” as a measure of
success, rather than traffic or actual readership.75 This subtle distinction
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

See supra note 63.
In this instance, the “full force” argument would indicate a requirement that a state interest be
“substantial.” Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 760.
Id. at 762 (citing Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–
72 n.24 (1976)).
Pennycook, supra note 1, at 39.
Id.
Planet Money: Finding the Fake-News King (Episode 739), NPR (Dec. 2, 2016) (downloaded using iTunes).
Silverman, supra note 50.
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represents a significant change in the way that information consumers
interact with the news. In effect, it reveals an important aspect of fake news
in the attention economy: where the goal is maximizing clicks, the goal of
fake news is less to be read than to be shared.76
These goals rebut a fundamental premise of the marketplace of ideas
theory: that the persistence of an idea correlates to its truth. The failure of a
news article to be read and spread today may just as well be attributed to a
marketing and algorithmic failure as a journalistic oversight. In addition to
using clickbait techniques to drive revenue through clicks, the way content is
displayed online is also subject to the new rules of the attention economy.77
Beyond the more superficial effectiveness of clickbait science, studies on news
sharing behaviors have shown that the psychological processes involved in
the decision to repost a particular article on social media do not trigger
regions of the brain used in analytic thought-processing. Critically, as a
result, the decision to share is less related to a belief in the accuracy of the
article.78 Rather, in many instances, this behavior is hypothesized to be
driven instead by concerns about reputation or virtue signaling.79
Additionally, social media platforms have come under fire for the
proliferation of “filter bubbles,” or echo chambers created when algorithms
behind users’ news feeds are programmed to selectively display content in
line with those users’ existing beliefs.80 There is conflicting evidence as to the
consequences of these algorithms on the dissemination of fake news, with
technology companies claiming that “the related filter-bubble effect is due to
the user’s network and past engagement behavior – such as clicking only on
certain news stories) that is, it is not the fault of the newsfeed algorithm but
the choices of users themselves.”81 These studies have been challenged by
76

77

78
79
80
81

The most well-cited example of this is an NBC report that Macedonian teenagers were able to
make tens of thousands of dollars creating fake news in the later stages of the U.S. election. Smith
& Banic, supra note 53. This effect is not limited to electoral politics however. See Dickerson, supra
note 14 (highlighting how fake news outlets created an inaccurate story about an alleged sexual
assault in a small Idaho town). Notably, research in 2019 has shown that about 8.5% of American
Facebook users actually shared fake news stories in 2016, a smaller percentage than expected, but
still a staggering figure given the sheer number of Facebook users nationally. Guess et al., Less Than
You Think: Prevalence and Predictors of Fake News Dissemination on Facebook, 5 SCI. ADVANCES 1 (Jan. 9,
2019), https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/5/1/eaau4586/tab-pdf.
Pennycook, supra note 1, at 38 (citing Jillian A. Jordan et al., Why Do We Hate Hypocrites? Evidence for
a Theory of False Signaling, 28 PSYCHOL. SCI. 356 (2017); Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund, Evolution
of Indirect Reciprocity (Int’l Inst. for Applied Sys. Analysis, Interim Report IR-05-079, 2005),
http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/7763/).
Id.
Id.
Dominic DiFranzo & Kristine Gloria-Garcia, Filter Bubbles and Fake News, 23 XRDS MAG., April
2017, at 33.
Id. at 33–34. Of course, this conflicting evidence comes from a study performed by Facebook in
2015 and should be evaluated in that context.
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social and computer scientists who note that this attempt by technology
giants to deflect responsibility for shaping individual opinion misses the point:
these algorithms constitute a worrisome form of censorship, self-imposed or
not.82 In light of the well-documented human susceptibility to false
information in social situations, particularly that arguments from “in-group
sources” are viewed less critically, the effects of filter bubbles make the
likelihood of correction even lower.83 In Holmes’ view, the value of
information depends on its contribution to discourse in the marketplace of
ideas, and discourse requires active manipulation of ideas.84 From this
understanding, then, extending the same First Amendment protection to
fake news would be more difficult to justify on the basis of its meager
contribution to an algorithmically engineered and often mindless dialogue.
Hearkening back to early Supreme Court decisions that defended the
unique ability for the press to “shed . . . more light on the public and business
affairs of the nation than any other instrumentality of publicity,”85 it is
unclear where fake news falls. Particularly as it pertains to non-political fake
news relating to private parties, its informational and expressive value to the
marketplace of ideas is questionable.86 That said, in Alvarez, a mere failure
to affirmatively add value to the marketplace was still insufficient to remove
First Amendment protection for false speech, and additional effects must also
be considered.87

82

83

84
85
86
87

Id. at 34. (“Specifically, [social scientist] Zeynep Tufekci rebutted many of the findings and
methodology of the study, accusing it of under-playing its most important conclusion that the
newsfeed algorithm decides placement of posts and this placement greatly influences what users
click and read. Tufekci also highlighted that the sampling was not random and thus cannot be
generalized across all Facebook users.”).
See generally Rod Bond & Peter Smith, Culture and Conformity: A Meta-Analysis of Studies Using Asch’s
(1952b, 1956) Line Judgment Task, 119 PSYCH. BULLETIN 111, 111–137 (1996); D.J. Flynn, et al.,
The Nature and Origins of Misperceptions: Understanding False and Unsupported Beliefs about Politics, 38
ADVANCES POL. PSYCHOL. 129 (2017).
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
The theory proposed by the Alvarez majority that the prevention of chilling effects is a value
associated with the otherwise valueless speech will be addressed in Part III.
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 715 (2012). Finally, it should be noted that the insinuation
by the Alvarez majority that the prevention of chilling effects is a value associated with the otherwise
valueless speech will be addressed in a discussion of government intervention Part III. Id. For the
purposes of this analysis, however, reducing a chill on speech will be treated as a value associated
with declining to regulate, not a value inherent to the speech itself.
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B. The Harm of Fake News
In addition to the value of false speech, the Court in Alvarez also
considered its harms.88 It is not enough to simply show that some forms of
fake news have limited informational value and fail to contribute to public
discourse. The Government’s failure to demonstrate that Alvarez’s lie
damaged the military in some concrete way was critical to the court’s finding
that the lie was protected.89 On top of the aforementioned distortionary
effects on the marketplace of ideas itself, fake news that defames particular
social groups obviously involves a distinct dignitary harm to those individuals
and a harm to a peaceful society. These are typical of the damages
historically addressed by a criminal libel suit in particular,90 though the stakes
with fake news and modern technology are notably higher than ever before.
The unique medium of the social mediascape can amplify these harms
exponentially.
As to the effect of fake news, the aforementioned motivation to create
content that will generate profit betrays a dangerous incentive to capitalize
on existing social tensions if that is what audiences are psychologically
primed to click on. A growing body of research explores the idea that certain
forms of fake news not only have a higher tendency to “go viral,” but are also
more persistent in the news landscape because they are harder to debunk.91
As such, even a “debunked” news story may still be able to turn a profit. This
may mean that there is no incentive to make fake news any more accurate
than the bare minimum required for the initial click.
Researchers at Dartmouth College have studied the effects of
misinformation on the human psyche, and their conclusions, along with
others in the field, have slowly narrowed in on a set of factors that perpetuate
certain types of fake news and render corrective information less effective.92
Some of their findings are more mechanical: for example, graphical rather
than textual corrections to fake news stories are more persuasive.93 However,
other findings reveal that there are powerful incentives behind the reckless

88
89
90

91
92
93

Id. at 725–26.
Id. at 719, 726.
Robert Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
691, 702–703 n. 67 (“The function of [common law libel] was epitomized in the law of seditious
libel, which punished as a crime any speech that may tend to lessen the King in the esteem of his
subjects, may weaken his government, or may raise jealousies between him and his people.”
(internal brackets and quotations omitted)).
See generally Flynn, supra note 83, at 130–31 (summarizing studies on the effects of misperceptions
and corrective information over the last eight years).
Id. at 131–133.
Id. at 131.
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creation of incendiary defamatory content, and further explain why
information consumers struggle to sort through it all.
In this environment, it appears that the creation of fake news that preys
on the existing fears of a particular group may be more profitable because it
is more likely to be engaged with, and that this type of content is less likely to
be corrected in the long run. “Directionally motivated reasoning” or
“affirmation bias” here refers to a tendency of information consumers to seek
out content that reinforces their existing preferences, whether it be partisan
leanings or pre-formed opinions.94 This suggests a positive feedback loop for
certain kinds of fake news: if a given group is more attracted to certain
headlines that float around in their newsfeeds, they are more likely to click.
To complicate matters, the entities paying for those clicks often have no
idea what content brought their future customers to click on their online
advertisements in the first place. This is because a large portion of online
advertising is automated, meaning that advertisers rarely choose where they
place their ads; they simply bid for space on high-traffic content.95 If more
clicks yields higher profits, this incentivizes the production of more fake news,
especially where there is little to no human oversight.
Contrasted with Mr. Alvarez’s easily fact-checked statement that he
received the Medal of Honor, the research above tells us that certain types
of fake news may be far more resilient. Aside from indicating why some fake
news is believable in the first place, self-affirming reasoning also tends to
explain why, when confronted with certain types of false information,
attempts to correct it may be less or even entirely unpersuasive.96
More frighteningly as it pertains to fake news that stokes existing ethnic,
racial, or religious conflicts, however, studies show that this persistence is
particularly strong where the information relates to an identity threat.97 If

94

95

96
97

Id. at 132 (citing Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, Citizens’, Scientists’, and Policy Advisors Beliefs About Global
Warming, 658 ANNALS AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 271, Mar. 2015; Charles S. Taber & Milton
Lodge, Motivated Skepticism in the Evalutaion of Political Beliefs, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 755 (2006); Kevin J.
Mullinix, Partisanship and Preference Formation: Competing Motivations, Elite Polarization, and Issue
Importance, 38 POL. BEHAV. 383 (2016)).
Pagan Kennedy, How to Destroy the Business Model of Breitbart and Fake News, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/07/opinion/sunday/how-to-destroy-the-business-model-ofbreitbart-and-fake-news.html. The New York Times reports that a campaign to expose large
advertisers who purchase ad space on websites, like Breitbart News, that frequently peddle in false or
misleading content that “incite violence and discrimination against minority groups” has been
relatively effective in changing company policies, and now more advertisers than ever are more
conscientious about where to place ads online.
Flynn, supra note 83, at 143–44. (“[C]onditions such as polarization, party cues, and others . . . lead
to misperceptions about some (but certainly not all) political facts.”).
Garrett et al., Undermining the Corrective Effects of Media-Based Political Fact Checking? The Role of Contextual
Cues and Naïve Theory, 63 J. COMM. 617, 620 (2013) (“Naïve theories which imply that a group,
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people will tend to reason their way towards conclusions that “reinforce
existing loyalties rather than conclusions that objective observers might deem
‘correct,’” this would indicate that groups are less likely to be corrected on
information that pertains to other “out” groups, particularly those that they
already perceive as threatening.98
This suggests that fake news is particularly persistent where it exploits
existing tensions between groups, and this effect may be amplified where one
of those groups is perceived to threaten the existing social order.99 The
nature and popularity of anti-immigrant disinformation during the 2016
election is an example this effect. A 2017 study from the Berkman Klein
Center at Harvard University noted that during the 2016 election,
immigration was the most covered subject on social media, and that Breitbart
News was responsible for more shared immigration content than any other
major news source.100 Critically, however, Breitbart’s immigration stories
were primarily framed in terms of “fear of Muslims and Islam, expressed
both in cultural and physical security terms,” and relied less on traditional
economic or resource-based conservative rhetoric.101 The study noted that
while the impact of profit-driven clickbait on the election itself may have
been minimal, more subtle “disinformation and propaganda” from partisan
sites like Breitbart were primarily effective in “reorienting the public

98

99

100
101

whether it is defined by religion, race, ideology, or something else, threatens the dominant social
order can be particularly powerful.”).
Flynn, supra note 83 at 133 (citing Gerber, Green & Larimer, Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence
from a Large-Scale Field Experiment, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 33 (2008); Alan S. Gerber & Todd Rogers,
Deceptive Social Norms and Motivations to Vote: Everybody’s Voting and So Should You, 71 J. POL. 178 (2009);
Paluck 2011; Jonathan Meer, Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Peer Pressure in Charitable Solicitation, 95 J.
PUB. ECON. 926 (2011); Bryan Bollinger & Kenneth Gillingham, Peer Effects in the Diffusion of Solar
Photovoltaic Panels, 31 MARKETING SCI. 900 (2012); Robert M. Bond et al., A 61-Million-Person
Experiment in Social Influence and Political Mobilization, 489 NATURE 295 (2012); Felipe Kast, Stephan
Meier & Dina Pomeranz, Under-Savers Anonymous: Evidence on Self-Help Groups and Peer Pressure as a
Savings Commitment Device, (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 6311, 2012),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7c79/a0fc01b59924a1e2b6951cc55bd842b03a8e.pdf;
Elizabeth L. Paluck & Hana Shepherd, The Salience of Social Referents: A Field Experiment on Collective
Norms and Harassment Behavior in a School Social Network, 103 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 899
(2012), in support of the proposition that “humans are heavily influenced by their peers and social
contacts.”).
In line with these findings, it is interesting to note that, “reminders of social difference or cues about
outgroup membership may also reduce the effectiveness of corrections.” Flynn, supra note 83, at
130.
FARIS ET AL., PARTISANSHIP, PROPAGANDA & DISINFORMATION, ONLINE MEDIA & THE 2016
U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 6, 13 (2017).
Id. at 95 (The [Breitbart] headlines appear to have been designed to propagate fear of immigrants in
general, but with a heavy Islamophobic focus. Among the top 20 most shared stories, nine
referenced Muslims, five referenced crime or terrorism, two mentioned disease, and eight cited
specific large numbers of immigrants.”).
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conversation” on controversial topics.102 As it pertained to immigration,
Breitbart was able to draw readers and amplify existing biases with mixedtruth coverage, punchy, alarming headlines, and exploitation of existing
stereotypes and fears.103 Given the psychology of social media sharing
behaviors noted above and resulting incentives to create semi-true content
that exploits identity threats, it is perhaps not a coincidence that an outlet
using these tactics skyrocketed to the most-shared news source of the election
in a matter of months.104
Compared to other potential targets of fake news, minority groups are
particularly susceptible to online defamation for the above reasons, and that
vulnerability is easily translated into violence off-screen. The race to the
bottom by content creators is not new, as will be discussed with the increased
popularity of the radio and worries about the destructive power of
“sensationalist” media between world wars.105 However, in the new
paradigm, where content is cheap, attention is expensive, profit margin is
wide, and risk is zero, these effects are not only intensified—they are
incentivized.
For example, studies show that media coverage of immigrants is strongly
correlated with public opinions of those populations on a macro level.106 In
Europe, research shows that even mere overestimations about the percentage
of the total population comprised of immigrants “are associated with antiimmigrant attitudes and policy preferences.”107 Furthermore, social
dynamics in opinion formation are incredibly important to the physical
realization of hatred, with Koopmans and Olzak finding in 2004 that
102
103
104

105
106

107

Id. at 20.
Id. at 95.
Clare Malone, Trump Made Breitbart Great Again, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug 18, 2016),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/trump-made-breitbart-great-again/ (detailing the meteoric
rise of Breitbart readership in the months preceding the 2016 election, to 18 million readers or 9%
of the market at one point).
A. BRAD SCHWARTZ, BROADCAST HYSTERIA: ORSON WELLES’S WAR OF THE WORLDS AND
THE ART OF FAKE NEWS 226 (2017).
Hajo Boomgaarden & Rens Vleigenthart, How News Content Influences Anti-Immigration Attitudes:
Germany, 1993–2005, 48 EUR. J. POL. RES. 516, 518–19 (2009) (“News media can influence people’s
readiness to categorize others. By emphasizing the ethnicity of news subjects, news media can
contribute to a sense of in-group belonging and, accordingly, to out-group hostility.”).
Flynn, supra note 83, at 130. This effect has been seen less clearly in the United States, with Hopkins
et al. finding in 2017 that “perceptions of immigrant populations may be more a consequence than
a cause of attitudes toward immigration.” Hopkins et al., The Muted Consequences of Correct
Information About Immigration, at 319 (June 18, 2018), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/
8nc847x1#main. That said, the researchers did not find that this “necessarily cast doubt on the
power threat theory writ large.” For one, it is consistent with the hypothesis that fake news tends
to further polarize existing beliefs, and it “simply suggests that other mechanisms are needed to
explain why people perceive an outgroup as threatening based on its presence in a particular
geographic context.” Id.
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visibility and proposed support for right-wing violence in the news actually
correlates significantly with violence against minority ethnic groups.108 More
recently in Germany, government officials have even conceded to the link
between violent, far-right activity and fake news after several false stories on
social media stoked the most severe anti-immigrant rioting that the country
had seen in decades.109
The vast literature documenting the exacerbating effects of unchecked
defamatory content on existing tension spans from the Holocaust110 to the
Rwandan genocide111 and the current ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims
in Myanmar.112 The United States is not immune, and if there is any lesson
to be learned from the fake-news-inspired protest in Twin Falls, Idaho, it is
that the corrosive effects of misinformation act quickly and unpredictably.113
Returning to the Alvarez dichotomy, then, the marketplace of ideas
justification for protecting fake news appears relatively weak, since its
potential harm seems to outweigh its value.114 Despite being a part of the
indispensable “fourth pillar” of American democracy, fake news does little to
uphold democratic functions typically underlying a more unbending theory
of press freedom. In fact, its perpetuation via social media undermines its
ability to inform productive discourse in general, much less discourse of
democratic importance.
Furthermore, given the psychological and
economic factors at play with fake news online, the marketplace is less able
to correct for this imbalance. The logical conclusion might be that a passive
approach depending on that illusory corrective power would be ineffectual
and may leave affected groups vulnerable. Then again, a shift from reliance
on the marketplace of ideas to government intervention is equally

108
109
110

111

112

113
114

Ruud Koopmans & Susan Olzak, Discursive Opportunities and the Evolution of Right‐Wing Violence in
Germany, 110 AM. J. SOC. 198, 223–24 (2004).
Dettmer, supra note 9.
See Laraine R. Fergenson, Group Defamation: From Language to Thought to Action, in GROUP
DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 71, 74–75 (Monroe H. Freedman & Eric M. Freedman
eds., 1995) (discussing Nazi propaganda during World War II).
David Yanagizawa-Drott, Propaganda vs. Education: A Case Study of Hate Radio in Rwanda, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PROPAGANDA STUDIES 378, 378-81, 389 (Jonathan Auerbach & Russ
Castronovo eds., 2013).
Nick Baker, How Social Media Became Myanmar’s Hate Speech Megaphone, MYANMAR TIMES (Aug. 5,
2016), https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/21787-how-social-media-became-myanmar-shate-speech-megaphone.html; Associated Press, Authorities Find Rape Case Causing Mandalay Unrest
Was Faked, IRRAWADDY (Jul. 21, 2014), https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/authoritiesfind-rape-case-causing-mandalay-unrest-faked.html.
See generally Dickerson, supra note 14 (describing how quickly a fake news story and misinformation
about a small Idaho town spread across the United States).
This model of analysis is, again, based on the simple categorical approach put forth in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire for determining when First Amendment protection should uniformly retreat from a
particular area of speech. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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undesirable, as Part III will address. The more apt question in the interim
may be one of time and scale, and whether the failure of the marketplace of
ideas necessarily means that a resort to the law is warranted in spite of human
adaptability.
C. Historical Precedents of a Hands-off Approach to New Technology
As the American public moves further from the reality that informed its
original conceptions of free expression, some suggest that the marketplace of
ideas was never a useful metaphor for justifying the protection of factually
false information in the first place.115 Zachary Price of U.C. Hastings Law
School acknowledges that under the First Amendment, Americans have
“enlightenment protections without enlightenment minds.”116 Given the
human infallibility before the insidious influences of the internet, he says it is
unproductive to imagine that the marketplace theory could ever work in
reality.117 However, in his 2018 article, “Our Imperiled Absolutist First
Amendment,” Price defends an interpretation that would still refuse
government intervention on the issue of fake news.118
If suspicion of government led to the rise of the current, inflexible
formulation for protecting free expression, and the government is composed
of individuals equally susceptible to the manipulations of fake news, Price
contends that it is only “more imperative to keep the channels of
communication open to competing viewpoints.”119 That said, any solution
that avoids government interference is a more pragmatic extension of the
marketplace of ideas theory: it nonetheless places the power to distinguish
true from false in the hands of the information consumer. As discussed
above, however, the entrepreneurs of online deception might again prove the
creaky First Amendment foundation too weak to withstand to such a
dangerous development in the fight against unwarranted group-based
prejudice.
The absence of government intervention into open discourse is frequently
justified by the idea that, when forced to confront certain low-value speech,
the populace eventually develops immunities to the harms it incurs.120 Some
legal scholars go so far as to view this immunity not only as a mere byproduct

115
116
117
118
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Zachary Price, Our Imperiled Absolutist First Amendment, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 817, 835–36 (2018).
Id. at 831.
Id. at 834–35.
Id.
Id. at 835.
Id. at 836.
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of tolerance, but as having an important social value of its own.121 However,
given that the “absolutist” conception of the First Amendment is largely a
still growing development of the last hundred years or less,122 the limits of our
collective immune system have only been tested a few times. Price suggests
that in the face of fake news, “the public will gradually inoculate itself against
online manipulation, much as it eventually did with respect to earlier forms
of propaganda.”123 This warrants another examination into how closely the
analog past mirrors our digital present and whether the passive approach’s
success in the past means that it will work in the future. While the particular
problems posed by social media-driven fake news are novel, the best
comparison might be drawn between the internet age and the advent of the
radio—hailed less than a century ago as a dangerous new medium for large
scale misinformation arising in a similarly charged time.
In the years between the world wars, when radio first began proliferating
as a means of delivering media to the public, fears of mass violence in
response to inciting fascist propaganda sound eerily familiar today. “The
greatest organizers of mass hysterias and the mass delusions today are states
using the radio to excite terrors, incite hatreds, inflame masses,” one wellknown radio personality commented about the rapidly spreading
technology.124 Aside from its scale, radio as a medium was unique in its
ability to stir passions, particularly the emotive quality of the human voice.
“Charismatic leaders, such as Adolf Hitler and Josef Goebbels, the Third
Reich’s Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, used highpitched vocal frenzies to produce mass hysteria and emotion in their listeners
. . . in ways that print could not,” noted Tiffany McKinney in a policy
exploration of Radio Propaganda Disarmament.125 American talk radio
121

122

123
124

125

Lee C. Bollinger, Rethinking Group Libel, in GROUP DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND VIOLENCE 243, 248-49 (Monroe H. Freedman & Eric
M. Freedman eds., 1995).
See Price, supra note 115, at 820 (suggesting that the First Amendment was largely dormant through
the 1930s and 1940s and adopted a more absolutist line in response to Jim Crow laws). Alexander
Meiklejohn’s article, aptly titled, The First Amendment is an Absolute, is also widely cited as providing
an influential overview of First Amendment Absolutism, though he suggests that the Schenck v. United
States decision, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) was the true genesis of the debate about absolutism today.
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245.
Price, supra note 115, at 836.
Adrian
Chen,
The
Fake-News
Fallacy,
NEW
YORKER
(Sept.
4,
2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/04/the-fake-news-fallacy (quoting Dorothy
Thomas).
Tiffany McKinney, Radio Jamming: The Disarmament of Radio Propaganda, 13 SMALL WARS &
INSURGENCIES 111, 112–13 (2002) (“Moreover, unlike print, the special characteristics of radio
allow the menace of radio hate propaganda to be multiplied many times over. Broadcasts, for
instance, can be copied for multiple hearings and easily leave the confines of the station’s local
listening area, reaching citizens in distant areas of the country and even in other parts of the world.
A radio wave takes only 1/7th of a second to encircle the entire globe.”).
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personality Father Charles Coughlin successfully wielded similarly
manipulative techniques, including scapegoating, name-calling, and appeals
to prejudice and bigotry to target minorities amidst populist appeals in the
1930s.126 In this way, clickbait science is not the first mass campaign of
emotionally evocative misinformation to reach American shores.
The international community responded to this new media by cracking
down on radio broadcasts referred to then as “fake news.” These fears
inspired resolutions from the League of Nations in 1927 opposing all news
that was “obviously inaccurate, highly exaggerated, or deliberately
distorted.”127 The United States clung to its comparatively strong protections
of free press and resisted these “fake news” resolutions, insisting that false
news on the radio required more press freedom, not less.128 However, that
is not to say that the United States lacked any government-administered
domestic protection from dangerous misinformation.129
Although group libel had yet to be affirmed as a response to defamation
of targeted minorities, a hands-on regulatory scheme referred to as the
“Public Interest Theory” dominated American broadcast media law during
this time. The theory was a response to public worries that, given radio’s
power over public opinion, a laissez-faire approach to the First Amendment
relying on the marketplace of ideas would fail.130
Central to effectuating the Public Interest Theory, the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) adopted the fairness doctrine in
1949.131 The rule imposed an affirmative obligation on radio and television
broadcasters to cover important and controversial issues of public interest,
providing equal access to competing viewpoints on those issues.132
Additionally, attacks made “upon the honesty, character, integrity or like
personal qualities of an identified person or group” mandated structured
opportunities for the attacked to respond.133 It was understood that the radio
required these regulations: not only were the means of content production
and dissemination too limited to an elite, non-representative few, but the

126
127
128
129
130
131
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133

Jack Kay et al., From Coughlin to Contemporary Talk Radio: Fallacies & Propaganda in American Populist
Radio, 5 J. RADIO STUD. 9, 11–13 (1998).
WILLIAM PRESTON JR. ET AL., HOPE AND FOLLY: THE UNITED STATES AND UNESCO, 1945–
1985, at 27 (1989).
Id. at 27–28.
Id.
Note, Offensive Speech and the FCC, 79 YALE L.J. 1343, 1345–46 (1970).
Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a “Chilling Effect”? Evidence from the
Postderegulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 279 (1997).
Id. at 279–80.
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1969).
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radio was “the most influential medium for communicating ideas and
shaping consciousness that has ever existed.”134
Historian A. Brad Schwartz offers a defense of the fairness doctrine in his
book on the predecessors of fake news, noting that “When news is forced to
compete for ratings, journalism all too easily gives way to
sensationalism…[and] [t]his can lead to a dangerous form of fake news with
long-lasting repercussions.”135 Schwartz’s note on the tendencies of a
“capitalist” media poignantly foreshadows the phenomena that have allowed
fake news online to be so profitable, and so dangerous absent regulation.
Today, the rest of the international community has (at least ostensibly)
fallen more in line with the American view on truth in journalism, embracing
the right of the media to be free from criminal sanctions for publishing false
information.136
Domestically, the fairness doctrine escaped First
Amendment attack in 1969, when Red Lion Broadcasting Company
challenged the FCC’s ability to force them to allow a defamed author to
respond to criticism made on its airwaves.137 Instead of viewing the fairness
doctrine as a hindrance to the marketplace of ideas, the Supreme Court saw
government intervention into broadcasting as facilitating it, by promoting
discourse in the public interest.138 It remained the law of the land for
decades, only coming to an end after an FCC vote in 1987. By that time,
there was enough competition in the broadcasting industry that enforcing
diversity of viewpoints no longer seemed necessary.139
There are many parallels between the early years of both the radio and
the internet. However, the comparison is far from perfect, and a view that
our collective adaptability to propagandistic radio broadcasting indicates
resilience in the face of online misinformation may be overly-optimistic.
134
135
136

137
138
139

Note, supra note 130, at 1351.
A. BRAD SCHWARTZ, BROADCAST HYSTERIA: ORSON WELLES’ WAR OF THE WORLDS AND THE
ART OF FAKE NEWS 227 (2015).
During a Universal Periodic Review of Cameroon, the United Nations Human Rights Committee
stated that “the prosecution and punishment of journalists for the crime of publication of false news
merely on the ground, without more, that the news was false, [is] in clear violation of Article 19 of
the [ICCPR].” U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations, ¶24, CCPR/C/79/Add.116 (Nov.
1999). For more information about the international legal attitude towards fake news, see U.N.
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and
Expression, CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011), particularly recommendations 33 and 34, 47 and
49, relating to necessity and proportionality of restrictions on free speech, decriminalization of
defamation and memory laws.
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389–90.
Id.
Robert D. Hershey Jr., F.C.C. Votes Down Fairness Doctrine in a 4-0 Decision, N.Y. TIMES (Aug 5, 1987),
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/05/arts/fcc-votes-down-fairness-doctrine-in-a-4-0decision.html.
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To start, one of the primary drivers of the fairness doctrine as a response
to radio and not newspapers was the fact that control of the airwaves was
extremely restricted, and therefore more susceptible to the biases of a few
broadcasting companies.140 This was not the case for newspapers, and is
obviously not the case with the internet, where means of publication have
never been more accessible.141 A more interesting comparison arises,
however, between the top few broadcasting companies in the 1940’s and
Silicon Valley’s major social media players, who largely control how we view
and interact with news content today.142 While any particular biases woven
into the confidential algorithms of Facebook and Twitter may be opaque, it
is clear that advertising revenue is the major driver of high-level decisions
about what populates our news feeds.143 Suggestions that major social media
platforms should adopt a “public interest” agenda that would interfere with
bottom lines may be naïve given the profit margins at issue.144
It is unsurprising, then, that intermediaries have been the focus of
conversations about how best to tackle fake news through regulation.145 As
one extreme example, Germany’s 2017 NetzDG regulation made waves by
imposing heavy fines on social media platforms that fail to promptly remove
fake news from its platform.146 This type of legislation would be difficult to
implement smoothly in the United States, given that Germany’s law relies on
an existing set of private hate speech laws that have no American
counterparts and would face daunting First Amendment barriers.147
Constitutional concerns aside, it also would require an overhaul of the
American laws governing intermediary liability, which currently exempt
140
141
142
143
144
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Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392.
See Volokh, supra note 51, at 1806–07.
See DiFranzo, supra note 80, at 32–33.
Zeynep Tufekci, Yes, Big Platforms Could Change Their Business Models, WIRED (Dec. 17, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/big-platforms-could-change-business-models/.
Peter Cohan, Does Facebook Generate Over Half of Its Ad Revenue From Fake News?, FORBES (Nov. 25,
2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2016/11/25/does-facebook-generate-overhalf-its-revenue-from-fake-news/#4e496aa6375f (suggesting that it would be difficult to calculate
precisely how much money Facebook makes off of fake news, though “[i]t might be possible to
estimate how much Facebook ad revenue comes from fake news by multiplying the proportion of
time the user spends reading the fake news by Facebook’s total ad revenue.” Cohan continues that
“Facebook generated $7 billion in third-quarter revenue from two million monthly advertisers
seeking to reach its 1.6 billion users—noting that fake news accounted for more shares, reaction,
and comment than real news.”).
Paul Levinson, Government Regulation of Social Media Would Be a “Cure” Far Worse Than the Disease,
CONVERSATION (Nov. 28, 2017), https://theconversation.com/government-regulation-of-socialmedia-would-be-a-cure-far-worse-than-the-disease-86911.
Germany
Starts
Enforcing
Hate
Speech
Law,
BBC NEWS
(Jan.
1,
2018),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-42510868.
Diana Lee, Germany’s NetzDG and the Threat to Online Free Speech, CASE DISCLOSED (Oct. 10, 2017),
https://law.yale.edu/mfia/case-disclosed/germanys-netzdg-and-threat-online-free-speech.
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many internet service providers from responsibility for content posted on
their platforms under Section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act.148
The first mandated annual report released in July 2018 by the entities
regulated by NetzDG (primarily Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook)
elaborating on their compliance indicated that takedown rates varied widely
between tech giants. For the most part, no fines had been levied, and in most
cases the allegedly offending content has remained online.149 On the whole,
however, it is poignant to recall that Facebook’s previous attempts to debunk
false content failed to prevent that content from persisting in and corrupting
the marketplace of ideas. As such, it is yet unclear how effective NetzDG has
been at attacking the overarching persistent effects of fake news on Facebook,
even where content is removed.150
At a more foundational level, it seems that some of social media’s most
distorting features as a news platform are too deeply baked into its core to
remedy with an algorithm tweak or new user interface.151 From the failure
of sharing behavior to trigger analytical thought processes to the perverse
economy of racist clickbait, social media was perhaps primed for an
onslaught of fake news from its inception.152
This is by no means a suggestion that these platforms be abandoned as a
news source altogether, nor should the preceding discussion be viewed as an
unqualified endorsement of the fairness doctrine or government imposition
of intermediary-level liability as a solution to fake news. However, public
pressure on companies like Facebook to “fix” fake news by whatever means
necessary have led to some interesting developments since the 2016 election.
In late 2017, Facebook announced its intention to tweak its algorithms so
148
149

150
151
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47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012).
Dorothée Baumann-Pauly, German Companies Report on the Implementation of New Hate Speech Law,
N.Y.U. STERN CTR. FOR BUS. & HUM. RTS., (Aug. 7, 2018). https://bhr.stern.nyu.edu/blogs/
2018/8/7/german-companies-report-on-the-implementation-of-new-hate-speech-law.
Linda Kinstler, Germany’s Attempt to Fix Facebook is Backfiring, ATLANTIC (May 18, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/germany-facebook-afd/560435/.
See Zeynep Tufekci, Algorithmic Harms Beyond Facebook And Google: Emergent Challenges of Computational
Agency, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 203, 208, 215–17 (2015) (discussing the impacts of algorithmic
gatekeepers on public discourse and society generally).
In addition to the hostility of the First Amendment to “hate speech” laws of the sort that paved the
way for Germany’s NetzDG legislation, intermediary liability would face another challenge in
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which would insulate companies like Google and
Facebook from liability for the content they host. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2011); FINKEL ET AL., supra
note 56, at 29. Suggestions have been made in this vein that a solution to fake news bearing
resemblance to the takedown scheme provided for under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
might be appropriate, were it likewise permitted an exception under the CDA. FINKEL ET AL., supra
note 56, at 29. These suggestions have also been met with criticism, in that it would simply replace
a government censor with a private one, and in fear that overzealous or sloppy enforcement would
be more difficult to combat. Daphne Keller, Making Google the Censor, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 12, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/opinion/making-google-the-censor.html.
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that more user-generated content and less news media and promotional
content would feature in users’ news feeds.153 News media companies have
noted this change with disdain, many having recently expended precious
resources to conform to the new rules of social media.154 However, it may
overall prove to be a beneficial change for the information consumer and the
industry as a whole, creating a healthier distance between “social” and the
“media.”155
IV. CRIMINAL GROUP LIBEL AND A JUSTIFIED SUSPICION OF
GOVERNMENT
After evaluating the many issues with a solution to fake news that relies
on the marketplace of ideas, the alternative of active government
intervention must be considered as well. One of the most compelling avenues
for such intervention would be through defamation law. Justice Kennedy
refers to defamation in Alvarez as a traditionally permissible form of
government regulation targeting false speech that causes discrete harms.
Criminal group libel laws, specifically, have a controversial past in the United
States as a tool for combating speech that causes harm to minority groups.156
The rise and fall of these laws in various social and political contexts is a
telling indicator of how a government-administered solution would fare
today as a legal antidote to religiously, racially, or ethnically charged fake
news. Ultimately, as flawed as a passive approach to fake news might be, the
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Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Jan. 11, 2018, 7:28 PM), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/
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ATLANTIC
(Jan.
11,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/01/facebook/550376/ (“Facebook has
encouraged media to become dependent on it” but in light of these changes, “media should now
thank it. Facebook . . . has forced media to face the fact that digital advertising and ever-growing
web traffic will never sustain the industry, especially if that traffic comes from monopolies like
Facebook hoping to claim the entirety of digital-advertising dollars for themselves.”); Aja Romano,
Facebook Wants To Show You More News From Your Friends — And Less News From Journalists, VOX NEWS
(Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/1/12/16882536/facebook-news-feed-changes.
Foer, supra note 154. There has been little study on the longer-term effects of Facebook’s algorithm
shift since early 2018, but it is clear that digital publishers have been attempting to diversify their
traffic flows to adapt, some more successfully than others. Kathleen Chaykowski, Facebook’s Latest
Algorithm Change: Here Are the News Sites that Stand to Lose the Most, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kathleenchaykowski/2018/03/06/facebooks-latest-algorithmchange-here-are-the-news-sites-that-stand-to-lose-the-most/#b3d32c834ec4; Jim Waterson, As
HuffPost and BuzzFeed Shed Staff, Has the Digital Content Bubble Burst?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/jan/24/as-huffpost-and-buzzfeed-shed-staff-hasthe-digital-content-bubble-burst.
See A. JAY WAGNER & ANTHONY L. FARGO, CRIMINAL LIBEL IN THE LAND OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 1 (2015), for a map of states that still have criminal libel laws. As of their last tally in
2015, there were fourteen such states. Id. at 27 n.76.
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historical unpopularity and questionable utility of group libel is evidence that
it is an even less attractive option for today’s novel issues.
Before engaging on matters of practical significance, however, the first
hurdles to address are the theoretical justification and constitutionality of
such a defamation-based solution. Since James Madison’s early rebuke of
the Alien and Sedition Acts in the 1800 Report on the Virginia Resolutions,
criminal defamation laws have generally been subject to judicial suspicion,
particularly as applied to the media.157 Yet, there are several reasons why
some of the most widely cited justifications for extending protection to false
statements might permit a resort to criminal libel law for non-political fake
news that targets minority citizens. More broadly, suggestions that fake news
is entitled to the full force of constitutionally-mandated “freedom of the
press” based on a marketplace of ideas theory are uncompelling, as discussed
at length in Part II. More narrowly, however, under a purely “selfgovernance” theory of First Amendment protection, fake news that relates to
private individuals is not a part of the cherished category of political
discourse, as will be addressed in this section. From these understandings,
and the bare fact that the Supreme Court’s last word on group libel was to
find it constitutional in 1952, this analysis will proceed to evaluate it as a
legally plausible, though ultimately unwise alternative to the passive
approach described in Part II.158
Discussed here as a potentially ripe response to fake news, criminal group
libel laws can be distinguished from other forms of speech regulation on four
grounds. These distinctions illuminate its particular appropriateness as a
means to combat non-political fake news targeting individual members of
minority groups. First, and most obviously, fake news would be regulated as
libel rather than slander. Aside from the fact that it is written and not spoken,
fake news as libel would not implicate “the immediate flare-up of insult and
offense that ‘hate speech’ connotes,” in the words of Jeremy Waldron.159
Rather, it is when expression that tends to call into question the humanity of
others “becomes established as a visible or tangible feature of the
environment” that the harm truly occurs, thus inviting recourse to the law.160
The persistent effect of written speech is heightened with difficult-to-debunk
content like fake news on social media, as noted in Part III.
157

158
159
160

James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
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ed., 1836); see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1963); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714 (1931); cf. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
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Second, in attempting to prevent mass violence against groups of
individuals sparked by fake news, a solution that targets a public harm would
be more appropriate, suggesting a resort to criminal, rather than civil law.
The traditional civil tort foundations of defamation between private
individuals extended largely to addressing harms to individual honorific,
dignitary, and property rights.161 To the extent that this encompasses a
broader aim than to simply resolve private disputes, it is limited to the (now
purely metaphorical) old English interest in preventing “duels.”162
Meanwhile, criminal laws relate more to the relationship between the
individual, the public, and the state.163 In this way, the problem of fake news
and defamed minority groups leans more towards government over private
enforcement, in that it addresses harms felt both at individual and societal
levels.
Third, (and especially in the context of a libel against the press) a criminal
libel law targeting only existing fake news articles should be distinguished
from a prior restraint on speech. Near v. Minnesota approached an instance of
group defamation as a “public nuisance,” though the remedy was simply a
prohibition on further publication.164 Near famously rebuked this as prior
restraint on publication, under a “conception of the liberty of the press as
historically conceived and guaranteed,” so long ago as the time of
Blackstone.165 Libel, by contrast, stood on solid foundation for “punishment
for the abuse of the liberty accorded to the press is essential to the protection
of the public,” and as such, “common law rules that subject the libeler to
responsibility for the public offense, as well as for the private injury, are not
abolished by the protection extended in our constitutions.”166 While today,
libel is subject to First Amendment scrutiny, it theoretically receives less of a
categorical rebuke for its post-hoc nature, which would tend to chill far less
speech than other forms of pre-emptive government restraint.167 Applied to
161
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Id.
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931). Though styled as a “public nuisance” case,
interestingly enough, one of the charges at issue in Near was “malicious, scandalous, and defamatory
articles,” concerning, among others, “the Jewish race.” Justice Butler’s dissent found the racialized
and abusive content at issue particularly disturbing, and worthy of sanction. Id. He noted that
“existing libel laws are inadequate effectively to suppress evils resulting from the kind of business
and publications that are shown in this case.” Id. at 737 (Butler, J., dissenting). Butler lamented the
failures of a system that invalidated the Minnesota statute, thus exposing the community “to the
constant and protracted false and malicious assaults of any insolvent publisher who may have
purpose and sufficient capacity to contrive and put into effect a scheme or program for oppression,
blackmail or extortion.” Id. at 737–38.
Id. at 713 (majority opinion).
Id. at 715.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
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fake news, any speech restriction imposed would need to act only against
stories that are already swirling around social media, and not as a forwardlooking prohibition on creators, hosts, publishers, or sharers. In short, libel
is the best way to achieve this without running afoul of Near.
Finally, the proposed criminal defamation law would target only nonpolitical fake news, which is where criminal “group” libel comes into play.
In contrast to criminal libel more generally, criminal group libel is a
vindication of a public right through a private right. In other words, it seeks
to protects individual members of groups, not individuals themselves.
Criminal defamation, as a doctrine, has often been tied up in concerns about
its specific tendency to undermine democracy.168 Well-founded worries
about giving the censorial power to the government have directly inspired
many of the most significant modern refinements to the First Amendment
treatment of defamation: to protect critics of the government from
interference or even prosecution by the government.169 However, a patently
false tale about a fictional immigrant or racial minority has little to do with
the hallowed Madisonian understanding that “[t]he value and efficacy of the
[right of electing the members of the government] depends on the knowledge
of the comparative merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust.”170
The concept of a group libel law (a distinctly non-political cousin of the
outmoded seditious libel law) grew precisely out of this non-political
exception to Madison’s suspicion of criminal defamation. Instead of
protecting the state itself, group libel combats defamation impacting group
members’ acceptance into society, their occupational and educational
opportunities, their citizenship, or even their humanity.171
Constitutional legal scholar Robert Post has described the common law
of defamation as an “intellectual wasteland, perplexed with minute and
barren distinctions.”172 Although often fuzzy and overlapping, the four
distinctions listed above are nonetheless useful to this exercise, which aims to
rectify a specific but multidimensional type of harm as narrowly as possible.
Regulating political fake news as opposed to non-political fake news, for
example, would involve an entirely different calculus here, as would a law
targeting fake news that targets a specific individual, rather than a larger
minority group.
168
169

170
171
172

See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012).
Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200–01 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 71 (1964).
See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343–44 (1974), for a
similar effort in a civil libel context.
Madison, supra note 157, at 575.
WALDRON, supra note 5, at 57.
Post, supra note 90, at 691 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF
TORTS 243 (13th ed. 1929)).
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Among the potential solutions to the problem of racially, ethnically, or
religiously charged fake news today, criminal group libel is a tempting one.
Functionally, its deep historical roots in common tort law establish a
relatively neat legal framework around which duty, causation, and harm
might be framed.173 Although libel is no longer wholly thought to exist
outside of constitutional scrutiny, group libel targeted narrowly in terms of
race, religion, and ethnicity fails to clearly sound the alarm bell of unwieldy
government censorial power over political criticism. Despite popular
resistance among legal scholars and free speech advocates, this would not be
the first foray that the United States has taken into a governmentadministered solution to ethnic, religious, or racial defamation. This
historical background is critical in addressing real174 and hypothetical
arguments175 for the return of group libel today.
A. The Tempting Precedent of Group Libel in America
The uniquely American pursuit of social justice through criminal
defamation began in 1908 with a local film censorship law, drafted by a
Jewish lawyer in Chicago named Adolf Kraus.176 The first of its kind, it has
been suggested that his law was likely a reaction to the release of The
Clansman, a racially charged and highly offensive novel, as well as
“sensationalist” accounts of Jewish criminals published in McClure’s Magazine.
“For Jews and African Americans, the pain of social exclusion, the shame of
accusations of criminality, and the fear of violence motivated their efforts to
reform racial representations in popular culture, converging, in particular,
on the censorship of the new medium of motion pictures.”177 The law was
unusual among other similar censorship legislation at the time for two
reasons. First, it specifically aimed to curtail racial offense through certain
types of media, and second, the law was not limited to film.178 Kraus’s citywide law was eventually introduced to the Illinois state legislature in 1915 by
Robert Raymond Jackson, a Black state representative from Chicago, and a
173
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175
176
177
178

See generally Post, supra note 90, at 692 (acknowledging that reputation is a “mysterious thing,” but
exploring how defamation law has, over hundreds of years, created a framework for addressing
various forms of harm to it).
Philosopher Peter Singer has endorsed the idea that group libel should be revisited to combat fake
news, given the aforementioned threat to democracy, and the appeal of a criminal legal solution.
Peter Singer, Free Speech and Fake News, FINANCIAL ADVISOR (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.famag.com/news/free-speech-and-fake-news-30761.html?section.
WALDRON, supra note 5, at 64.
M. ALISON KIBLER, CENSORING RACIAL RIDICULE 116 (2015); Ellen C. Scott, Black “Censor,”
White Liberties: Civil Rights and Illinois’s 1917 Film Law, 64 AM. Q. 219, 221 (2012).
KIBLER, supra note 176, at 116.
Scott, supra note 176, at 223.
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version of it was passed in 1917.179 Censorship of this sort gelled with
Jackson’s unique vision for racial equality, which prioritized protecting the
image of African Americans from threatening stereotypes as a conduit to
protection from physical harm.180 From a legal perspective, the law faced
little scrutiny under the First Amendment: at that time, libel still generally
fell outside of the scope of constitutional speech protection and the Supreme
Court had categorically upheld film censorship in Ohio v. Mutual Films two
years earlier.181 A more searching inquiry into the legality of these types of
laws was simply yet to come.
A broader, nationwide fascination with “group libel,” (as it is known
today) began in 1942, and carried the conversation from the movie theater
to the front lines of World War II and defense of democracy from fascism.182
Attorney-turned-sociologist David Riesman lamented “the systematic
avalanche of falsehoods which are circulated concerning the various groups,
classes, and races which make up the countries of the western world” in a
series of articles about charged propaganda.183 As a Jewish GermanAmerican intellectual, Riesman’s analysis was framed around an ongoing
genocide within which he undeniably found himself at the center, though his
articles found broad appeal around the country.184
Riesman saw group libel as largely misunderstood and underutilized in
the United States. He found this to be the result of the American tendency
to view “reputation” as merely a capitalistic asset.185 Yet, to Riesman,
“reputation” had an intrinsic value critical to the safety of minority groups
and democracy as a whole.186 However, acknowledging an American
emphasis on protecting values of self-governance, Riesman noted that any
group libel law adopted “must be discriminating in judging what sorts of
criticism—though mistaken in fact—further democratic cause and which
sorts of defamatory falsehood hinder it.”187 Despite this Madisonian
homage, Riesman ultimately found that the risks of abuse were outweighed
by the risk of mass violence that opposed the use of group libel.188
179
180
181
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183
184
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Id. at 224.
Id. at 231, 235.
236 U.S. 230, 244–45 (1915).
Evan P. Schultz, Group Rights, American Jews, and the Failure of Group Libel Laws, 1913–1952, 66
BROOK. L. REV. 71, 124 (2000).
David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 727, 727 (1942).
Id. at 727; SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY
79–80 (1994).
Riesman, supra note 183, at 731.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 755.
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Ten years later, the Supreme Court of the United States agreed with
Riesman, handily upholding a criminal libel statute in Beauharnais v. Illinois,
again under the understanding that libel categorically fell entirely outside of
First Amendment protection.189 The challenge before the Court concerned
none other than Adolf Kraus and Robert Raymond Jackson’s 1917 Illinois
film censorship law. In that case, Joseph Beauharnais, the president of the
White Circle League of America, was charged criminally for distributing a
pamphlet which defamed the African-American race. The leaflet advocated
for the protection of the white race from “mongreliz[ation]” and “rapes,
robberies, guns, knives, and marijuana of the negro,” in such a way that it
unlawfully exposed African Americans to “contempt, derision, or obloquy”
or was “productive of breach of the peace or riots.”190
The Illinois statute, so hard-won in the state legislature by Assemblyman
Jackson thirty-five years earlier, was scrutinized by a court that had witnessed
tragedy uncontemplated when it was written in 1917. The majority’s defense
of the statute in Beauharnais noted that “Illinois did not have to . . . await the
tragic experience of the last three decades to conclude that willful purveyors
of falsehood concerning racial and religious groups promote strife and tend
powerfully to obstruct the manifold adjustments required for free, ordered
life in a metropolitan, polyglot community.”191 The immediacy of the racial
tensions in Chicago at the time certainly played a role in Frankfurter’s
opinion. However, on a larger scale, it seemed as if the horrors of World
Wars I and II were also fresh enough to fortify a state interest in regulating
speech unworthy of First Amendment protection for its divisive power.
Meanwhile, the dissenters hinted that the decision could be perverted in
practice, with Justice Douglas commenting, “Today a white man stands
convicted for protesting in unseemly language against our decisions
invalidating restrictive covenants. Tomorrow a Negro will be hailed before
a court for denouncing lynch law.”192 However, the fact that the libel statute
evaded true First Amendment analysis at the time meant that a rational basis
was all that was required for it to pass constitutional muster. Attempts to
reframe Mr. Beauharnais’ pamphlet within abstract discursive values or the
nature of democracy failed before the post-World War II reckoning with the
destructive power of the disillusioned masses.193 Ultimately, Douglas’s
practical concerns about group libel were defeated by the majority’s analysis
189
190
191
192
193

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
266 (1952).
Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 251–52; WALDRON, supra note 5, at 48.
Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258–59.
Id. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 301 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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of the dominant social risk at the time. As David Riesman had conceived of
it, “[i]n more or less democratic lands . . . the threat of fascism and the chief
dangers to freedom of discussion do not spring from the ‘state,’ but from
‘private’ fascist groups in the community.”194 With the affirmation of Joseph
Beauharnais’ conviction, fears of government abuse were suspended before
the greater threat posed by societal bigotry writ large, just long enough for
the affirmative restriction on speech to hold up.195
B. Practical Concerns and Subsequent Legal Developments
Today, the legal status of group libel laws is a topic of much debate.196
Their lurking presence in some state criminal codes is especially important
to note in evaluating its appropriateness in a new context: fake news that
defames minority groups.197 While its technical legal foundations have been
eroded, Beauharnais has never been explicitly overruled.198 In fact, it is still
cited, albeit furtively, for the proposition that libel carries with it a diminished
First Amendment value.199 In 1964, The Supreme Court held in New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), that private libel was no longer fully
immune from First Amendment scrutiny, which is the most frequently cited
roadblock to any proposed resuscitation of Beauharnais.200 Subsequent
extension of the Sullivan “actual malice” requirement to cases involving even
private figures has restricted its applicability beyond vindication of
democratic purposes and into a more encompassing protection of the press
194

195
196

197

198
199

200

Riesman, supra note 183, at 779. Reisman continued: “In this state of affairs, it is no longer tenable
to continue a negative policy of protection from the state; such a policy, in concrete situations, plays
directly into the hands of the groups whom supporters of democracy need most to fear.” Id. at 779–
80.
Id. at 778–79.
WALDRON, supra note 5, at 52. See generally WALKER, supra note 184, at 77–78 (contextualizing the
historical legal status of group libel laws); Kristen Grauer, From Beauharnais to Sullivan, 4
DARTMOUTH L.J. 21, 28 (2006) (suggesting that it remains an “open question” whether group libel
laws remain protected by the Constitution).
See COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, CRITICS ARE NOT CRIMINALS (2016),
https://cpj.org/x/6761 (discussing the status of state level criminal defamation laws in the United
States, noting that at least one state—Massachusetts—retains a group libel statute, though many
more still have broader criminal defamation laws).
WALDRON, supra note 5, at 61–62.
See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 747 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing types of
false information that are not within the First Amendment’s protection, noting that the ‘‘prevention
and punishment’’ of libel ‘‘have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem’’ (citing
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256 (1952)).
WALDRON, supra note 5, at 28 (citing ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE
HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 158–59 (2007)). Waldron contests both this
proposition, which he refers to as a “consensus,” and the broader idea that Sullivan “removed . . .
the whole category of libel from the list of exception to the protection of free speech” altogether.
Id. at 52.
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generally.201 Furthermore, in 1992, the categorical approach endorsed in
Chaplinsky was further complicated by the imposition of a “viewpoint neutral”
requirement in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.202 However, despite these legal
developments, social context can inform First Amendment jurisprudence in
significant ways, as the rise of group libel in the United States over a
tumultuous span of almost forty years demonstrates.203
While the Court’s more lax approach to government speech regulation
allowed group libel to be upheld in Beauharnais,204 it is important to remember
that an urgent social need at the time seemed to require this result.205 Lee
Bollinger noted several years after R.A.V. that while he did not then believe
that a criminal group libel law would necessarily stand up in the Supreme
Court, “a change in social conditions and a corresponding change of heart
about group libel would not find the First Amendment jurisprudence
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N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454–55
(2011) (finding a protest of the Westboro Baptist Church to be speech “fairly characterized as
constituting speech on a matter of public concern” (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146
(1983))); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (White, J., concurring) (holding
a televangelist to be a “public figure” who could not recover tort damages from a caricature); Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344–46 (1974) (holding that private individuals “are therefore
more vulnerable to injury [from defamatory statements], and the state interest in protecting them
is correspondingly greater”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76 (1964) (extending the “actual
malice” test to statements attacking “the personal integrity” of Louisiana judges).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571–72 (1942). The commonly held belief after R.A.V. is that the Chaplinsky categorical approach
case was too simplistic, and the court could no longer proceed on that line of analysis. It is unclear
how group libel would fare after R.A.V., given that on its face, a regulation that bans libel but only
certain types may not be viewed as “viewpoint neutral” under the new conception. The Court, in
dicta, addressed this problem briefly in its majority opinion, noting that while “libel” might still be
proscribable, a regulation that only targeted certain forms of libel might not stand up. R.A.V., 505
U.S. at 387; see also Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography after R.A.V., 60 U. CHI. L.
REV. 873, 876 (1993) (“Exceptions to the viewpoint neutral rule exist, although the Court rarely
has seen fit to acknowledge them as such; in a number of areas of First Amendment law, and
especially when so-called low- value speech is implicated, the Court breezily has ignored both more
and less obvious forms of viewpoint preference.” (internal brackets omitted)). Kagan mentions that
commercial speech, as an example, is an area especially prone to such exceptions, which perhaps
only strengthens earlier arguments that particular forms of commercially-driven fake news might
face an interesting evaluation under current First Amendment precedent. Id. at 876 n.13.
As for eluding the R.A.V. evolution, Kagan has suggested, for example, that placing the narrower
category of group libel, which has a “built in” viewpoint discrimination as a category again outside
of scrutiny. Id. at 899.
See, e.g., Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 257–58 (noting that libel is not subject to First Amendment
scrutiny); Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 247 (1915) (holding that film
is not entitled to First Amendment protection).
See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 259 (“In the face of this history and its frequent obligato of extreme
racial and religious propaganda, we would deny experience to say that the Illinois legislature was
without reason in seeking ways to curb false or malicious defamation of racial and religious groups,
made in public places and by means calculated to have a powerful emotional impact on those to
whom it was presented.”).
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unreceptive.”206 He posited that “a significant rise in violence toward certain
minority groups, especially if it were the product of a highly organized and
conspiratorial extremist group, could yield a different result, even under
existing Supreme Court precedents.”207 Given the ease with which
campaigns of fake news are created and disseminated, it is possible that even
a campaign falling short of a “highly organized effort” might be able to
generate widespread animosity towards a minority group (particularly one
posing an identity threat to the majority). The widespread defamation of a
small refugee population in Twin Falls, Idaho is an excellent example of how
little overarching strategy would be required to realize such an effort, beyond
a mastery of clickbait science and a receptive social media audience.208
In light of this uncertainty, the drawbacks of group libel must be
addressed. The lessons of American experimentation with group libel in the
twentieth century do not stop at an observation of its oscillating popularity
amidst varying degrees of social strife. This history also suggests that, in
addition to the unraveling of its theoretical legal foundations, group libel’s
overall decline over time was also a result of its impracticality as an
enforcement mechanism for the rights of minority groups. From the
inaptitude of litigation to effectively quash dangerous falsehoods to problems
associated with a government-wielded censorial power, criminal group libel
would be an unattractive solution to combat fake news, even if constitutional.
To start, there are several purely functional concerns with libel law as an
alternative “truth seeking” mechanism to the marketplace of ideas. The
English foundations of libel law provided no defense for truth, under the
premise that “the greater the truth, the greater the libel.”209 Today, however,
the defense is viewed as a necessary protection of free speech and legitimate
publication in a modern society.210 While sensible in theory, the defense of
truth poses many problems to preventing the spread of stereotypes and
falsities amongst susceptible information consumers through libel law.
First and most obvious of those issues is the difficulty of tracing layered
fake news trails like the alleged “Islamic Takeover” of Twin Falls, Idaho,
coverage of which was riddled with falsehoods rooted in an iota of truth.211
In a sense, the most damaging fake news campaigns are destined to be the
most difficult to detangle under modern libel law. Notably, Justice
206
207
208
209
210
211

Lee Bollinger, Rethinking Group Libel, in GROUP DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note
121, at 243.
Id.
See generally Dickerson, supra note 14.
Riesman, supra note 183, at 735.
Note, Group Libel Laws: Abortive Efforts to Combat Hate Propaganda, 61 YALE L. J. 252, 262 (1952).
See supra Part II.
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Frankfurter largely avoided the conversation about the truth of the
defamatory statements in Beauharnais. Rather, he deferred to the trial court,
which rejected the defendant’s offer to prove the truth of the matters.212 By
couching this evasion within the Chaplinsky conception that abusive words
have such “slight social value as a step to truth,” Frankfurter hinted that truth
was, in a sense, irrelevant to the inquiry, given the injury or incitement that
such abuse causes.213 Subsequent legal precedents modifying Chaplinsky
aside,214 a discussion of truth would be harder to avoid in a suit pertaining
less to opinion than disputed fact, for example, in a libel suit about a
contested news article or advertisement.215
Assuming that some discussion of truth would inevitably follow, the next
hurdle would be harm incurred in that very search. Early critiques of the
newly anointed group libel doctrine around the time of Beauharnais invoked
the “sounding board” technique used by Nazis in Germany.216 Libel suits
were not only an opportunity to martyrize Nazis, but also provided an
elevated platform for their propaganda, despite that the litigation was
instigated precisely to challenge it.217 Stateside, attempts in the 1930s to
bring similar libel suits against Henry Ford for his anti-Semitic publication,
The Dearborn Independent, were criticized by pragmatists for similar reasons.218
Later, the American Jewish Committee (“AJC”) defended its eventual
categorical rebuke of group libel as a civil rights tool, worrying that a defense
of truth might “turn the courtroom into a forum for discussion of such issues
as whether or not Jews are evil.”219

212
213
214
215
216
217
218

219

Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 253–54 (1952).
Id. at 257.
See e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Note, supra note 210, at 260.
Id. at 260 n.38.
Schultz, supra note 182, at 103. Although there was opposition to these lawsuits, one was eventually
brought after 1924. The Dearborn Independent claimed in 1924 that “San Francisco attorney Aaron
Sapiro and other Jews were using farm cooperatives to seize control of the nation’s agricultural
resources.” Id. at 109. Sapiro filed suit against Ford on behalf of “myself and my race.” Id. at 109.
The case came to trial eventually, though after mistrial was declared, and Ford subsequently
abandoned the suit. Id. at 109.
See WALKER, supra note 184, at 83–86; Riesman, supra note 183, at 733 n.27; Symposium, Federal
Group Libel Legislation: Should Jews and Jewish Organizations Support or Oppose?, NAT’L COMMUNITY REL.
ADVISORY COUNCIL LEGIS. INFO. BULL., at 1, 7 (June 10, 1949) (on file with the American Jewish
Congress archives). Interestingly, attempts to have Congress investigate Nazi and fascist groups in
America led to the creation of the House Special Committee on Un-American Activities (“HUAC”)
in 1938, which soon switched its main focus to Communists. See WALKER, supra note 184, at 60.
The HUAC eventually took on arguably anti-Semitic overtones in its hunts for Reds. Id.
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The modern (and notably more light-hearted) equivalent of this problem
is colloquially referred to as the “Streisand Effect,” named for Barbra
Streisand’s futile attempts to prevent publication of photos of her home in
2003.220 This phenomenon has already shown to have complicated the fakenews epidemic before any libel suits have even reached the courts. In
December 2017, Facebook announced that it would no longer flag stories it
hosts as “disputed,” since research had shown that this moniker had only
served to increase the likelihood that users would click on the article
flagged.221 In the end, the “search for truth” in highly inflammatory content
is a seemingly impossible one, given the realities of human psychology and
the new rules of the news media landscape. Regulating fake news promoting
intergroup conflict through libel might be legally justifiable in the proper
social context. However, even within this conception, libel again falls short
on grounds of functional utility.
The problems with group libel extend beyond the courts’ inability to
uncover the truth. As with any law that gives the government a censorial
power over speech, there is no guarantee that it will only be used in its
intended context. Government mistrust is central to a critique of libel law as
a tool for protecting minority groups on several levels. Most fundamentally,
it demonstrates its limitations as a doctrine rooted in First Amendment rather
than Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection ideals.222 Though group libel
was developed to protect vulnerable groups, its protections and powers are
not restricted in their use solely to the groups that may have developed or
advocated for them. Modern libel law requires a defense of truth, though,
especially in group conflict, “true” is not and cannot be a substitute for any
individual’s definition of “right,” “moral,” or even “useful” in a campaign
for social justice. More specifically, however, as it pertains to the press’s vital
role in modern society, even legal developments like the “actual malice”
requirement cannot fully prevent abuse and chilling effects. The inability of
libel law to successfully account for its inherent malleability is exacerbated by
a broader mistrust of government and the people who comprise it. For those
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Mario Cacciottolo, The Streisand Effect: When Censorship Backfires, BBC NEWS (June 15, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-18458567.
Jeff Smith, Grace Jackson & Seetha Raj, Designing Against Misinformation, MEDIUM (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://medium.com/facebook-design/designing-against-misinformation-e5846b3aa1e2.
For a complementary discussion about the origins of the 1917 Illinois group libel law and a
conception of censorship as an equalizing mechanism in a deeply racist society, see, e.g., Scott, supra
note 176, at 241 (“In an era in which there was de facto censorship of black subjectivity, Jackson
engaged in de jure censorship to promote black public recognition, a strategy of negotiation and
appeasement of dominant paradigms, though not dominant Progressive Era ideologies concerning
race or censorship. Jackson’s law is less a censorship law than an attempt to commandeer the
existing censorial impulse to a racially liberatory purpose.”).
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tackling fake news today, these concerns may ultimately be no different from
those faced by civil rights activists almost one hundred years earlier.
Again, history speaks for itself: the 1917 Illinois film censorship-turnedgroup-libel statute in Beauharnais was a criminal law to be enforced by the
state for the purpose of protecting vulnerable groups rather than further
victimizing them. From a practical perspective, the law was questionably
successful in this aim from the start, in large part because enforcement was
the duty of a largely white police force.223 The creation of adjunct citizen
film-censorship boards was an attempt to mitigate this problem, but political
forces yielded uneven access to those boards between certain minority
groups, and even resulted in hostility between them.224 Jackson’s state
censorship law failed to uniformly prevent the showing of The Birth of A Nation,
the film adaptation of the novel The Clansman, which had inspired the law’s
initial drafter.225
Even David Riesman, the original instigator of the American group libel
conception, eventually had his doubts once he saw the doctrine in use.
Sometime after writing his original articles (but a year before Beauharnais)
Riesman came full circle on his risk analysis pertaining to government
regulation of this particular form of social justice advocacy.226 Riesman
never directly explained what led him to abandon his prior advocacy of
criminal libel, but instances of confrontational, “militant” actions by Jewish
advocacy groups to enforce censorship of anti-Semitic speakers (and even use
of derogatory stereotypes in theatrical productions) was hypothesized to have
played a role.227 By that point, several other prominent Jewish groups had
abandoned support of the doctrine, including the AJC, as early as 1935.228
One of the earlier proponents of these laws, the AJC had decided that other
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Id. at 237–38.
KIBLER, supra note 176, at 167, 170 (“Jews, particularly Jewish women, gained more power in
censorship than other racial groups. Uneven access, as well as ongoing doubts about the wisdom
of protecting of any racial minority through censorship, led to complaints about the unfair politics
of Chicago censorship.”).
KIBLER, supra note 176, at 164; Scott, supra note 176, at 237.
See generally WALKER, supra note 184, at 99–100.
Id. at 99–100, 106. For more information about Riesman’s post-war views on complex Jewish
identity politics, see generally Susan A. Glenn, The Jewish Cold War: Anxiety and Identity in the Aftermath
of the Holocaust, in 24 DAVID W. BELIN LECTURE IN AM. JEWISH AFF. (Jean & Samuel Frankel
Center for Judaic Studies, 2014).
Schultz, supra note 182, at 129 (“While the AJC decided to oppose group libel laws as early as 1935,
other Jewish organizations took longer to develop a set policy about the topic . . . . [F]our major
Jewish defense organizations expressed their views about group libel in response to a bill offered in
Congress that would ban defamatory material from the mails and from interstate commerce.”).
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methods of enforcing civil rights for the Jewish population, like education,
would be more effective than a resort to criminal libel laws.229
Counterproductive enforcement only continued after the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of criminal group libel. Unsurprisingly,
Douglas’s dissent in Beauharnais indeed proved prophetic, and in the wake of
Brown v. Board of Education, segregationists looking for new ways to fight the
ever-expanding civil rights movement found a friend in libel law.230 A
campaign of targeted defamation suits aimed largely at northern, liberal
media coverage of racial issues and statements by organizations like the
NAACP aimed to divert precious resources from entities fighting the
oppression of African Americans.231
A range of anti-segregationist leaders had brought suit: from Mississippi
Sheriff Lawrence Rainey, over coverage of the murders of three civil rights
activists, to James Earl Ray, the confessed assassin of Martin Luther King,
Jr.232 Interestingly, however, these lawsuits were individual civil libel claims,
and yet the sentiment behind them encompassed much more than private
feuds. The northern anti-segregationist publications at issue were viewed by
Southerners as having attacked them as a people, and as a result, these
falsehoods were causing dangerous divisions in American society.233 New York
Times v. Sullivan was one such defamation case, and in limiting the reach of
libel law in the United States, its unexpected ruling helped to end what many
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230

231

232
233

Id. at 112. Among the other factors contributing to the abandonment of group libel amongst its
earlier proponents in the Jewish community was a feeling of anxiousness about the idea of outwardly
identifying as a distinct religious and ethnic group, when assimilation seemed to be the safest way
to avoid conflict in America at the time. Id. at 116.
Aimee Edmondson, In Sullivan’s Shadow: The Use and Abuse of Libel Law Arising from the Civil Rights
Movement, 1960–89, 37 JOURNALISM HIST. 27, 35 (2011); Christopher W. Schmidt, New York
Times v. Sullivan and the Legal Attack on the Civil Rights Movement, 66 ALA. L. REV. 293, 294-96.
Group libel was notably not the precise weapon of choice in these lawsuits, though likely only
because it did not need to be. Prior to 1964, the government did not need to disguise its attacks
within the more narrow framework of group-based defamation claims: maligned police
commissioners, mayors and public officers could easily bring suit in their individual capacities
without having to invoke the more complex dynamics involved in a Beauharnais-type lawsuit.
Schmidt, supra note 230, at 307–08.
Edmondson, supra note 230, at 32–33.
Schmidt, supra note 230, at 305–06, 310. Although these cases are not a direct indictment of group
libel, they nonetheless illustrate the danger libel poses in a highly polarized society. A common
note of frustration to the plaintiffs in several of those defamation suits were allegations of police
brutality, particularly when responding to civil rights demonstrations, a theme that continues to
divide Americans even today. See Rob Kahn, Three First Amendment Puzzles Raised by the Police Union
Response to Speech Criticizing Police Conduct in Ferguson and New York City, 8 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV.
163, 194 (2017) (“[I]t is worth noting that the tolerant society envisioned by Bollinger has not come
to pass in this particular context. Given how Ferguson and other, more recent police shootings
shine a light on implicit bias, it is worth exploring whether such bias also extends to the speech we
as a society feel is worth protecting.”).
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saw as a wave of libel litigation threatening to exhaust the civil rights
movement.234
C. Limitations of Modern Libel
Sullivan is significant to this analysis both because it factually illustrates
the misuse of libel laws during the civil rights movement, but also sketches
out the limitations of how the modern era has approached preventing such
abuse. While post-Sullivan developments in libel law do not clearly foreclose
the constitutionality of a group libel solution to fake news, they also do not
clearly address some of its major drawbacks. First, it is unclear whether
protections like the “actual malice” standard would apply to a group libel suit.
This is relevant to any liability imposed on the press, in particular, given that
a law failing to require some measure of intent would criminalize too-wide
of a range of news content beyond intentionally misleading fake news.
Second, even in spite of the “actual malice” standard, government abuse
might still occur through calculated libel enforcement against (instead of on
behalf of) vulnerable ethnic, racial, and religious groups.235 Third, beyond
the damaging potential of enforcement itself, the resulting chilling effect on
lawful news coverage would have potentially devastating impact, as would
be the case with any criminal imposition on free speech.
It is uncontested that Sullivan was a step in the right direction towards
addressing these issues, and its impact on libel liability, particularly for press
coverage of public officials, should not be understated. Factually, Sullivan
eerily mirrors what Justice Douglas foresaw in his Beauharnais dissent: an
advertisement taken out by anti-segregationist groups, attempting to gain
sympathy before northern liberals by weaving a poorly fact-checked
complaint about treatment of protesters in Alabama. In a landmark decision,
the Supreme Court stipulated a more stringent mens rea for civil libel:
“actual malice,” rather than the typical presumption of malice through mere
publication. Two years later, Garrison v. Louisiana would apply the Sullivan
civil libel “actual malice” standard to criminal libel.236
Sullivan and Garrison were in many ways tied to Madisonian ideals of
democratic justice, homages to the press’s unique role as “one of the great
interpreters between the government and the people.”237 In his Sullivan
234
235

236
237

Schmidt, supra note 230, at 325.
See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 233, at 194–95 (assessing the racialized current First Amendment
landscape surrounding issues of police brutality and implicit bias, and the flexible nature of “factual
dispute” in these discussions).
379 U.S. 64, 67, 69 (1964). Garrison would also impose further requirements as to a defense of truth
and statutory specificity on criminal libel laws. Id. at 70–73.
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
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opinion, Justice Brennan wasted no time in comparing a libel suit filed by a
Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama directly to the Sedition Act of
1798, stating that “[t]he right of free public discussion of the stewardship of
public officials was . . . a fundamental principle of the American form of
government.”238 However, this was not a discussion of broad mistrust in
government; it was simply a rejection of government’s ability to quash
democratic discourse. In fact, both opinions presented an opportunity to
expand the “actual malice” standard to more private libels, (à la Beauharnais),
but only raised the criminal libel statute to distinguish it from one that
permits cases to be brought by “public men” rather than a maligned social
group.239
The doctrine was expanded beyond the purely political in subsequent
cases, though the mens rea requirement for a group libel suit remedying
private reputational harm from false factual “press” coverage remains
opaque despite these holdings. As it pertains to libel, two bookend cases set
out a range within which such a law might fit: Gertz v. Robert Welch expanded
the press-protective scienter requirement of Sullivan to libel of public figures,
while the Court refused to apply actual malice where matters were in the
private interest of the two parties in Dun and Bradstreet v. Greenmoss.240 On one
hand, the fact that an audience is willing to click on a fake news article might
indicate that it is of broader interest than the holding in Greenmoss, which dealt
with private credit reports. On the other hand, the Gertz holding relied on a
conception that public figures willfully thrust themselves into the spotlight.
Because they are public figures having access to means of publicity, these
potential plaintiffs would be less reliant on libel law to correct any
defamation.241 This logic would not apply to private citizens defamed by a
fake news article. Even in the age of the internet, which arguably provides
anyone a platform from which to issue “corrections,” this may still not satisfy
Gertz, given the aforementioned difficulty in debunking particular forms of
fake news.
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N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274–75 (1964).
Id. at 268; Garrison, 379 U.S. at 70–71. Group libel was admittedly not clearly disrupted by Garrison,
with the majority noting that “only narrowly drawn statutes designed to reach words tending to
cause a breach of the peace. . . or designed to reach speech, such as group vilification, ‘especially
likely to lead to public disorders,’ such as the statute sustained in Beauharnais.” Garrison, 379 U.S. at
70.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343–44 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760–61 (1984).
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-44.
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Furthermore, an expansion of the “public figure” doctrine in parallel
cases involving the application of the “actual malice” standard in intentional
infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) cases raise further questions.242
Hustler v. Falwell (1988) extended the actual malice standard to suits for IIED
for false factual statements made about a public figure, well-known Baptist
minister Jerry Falwell.243 However, in 2011, the Supreme Court took a
different approach to its scienter analysis in Snyder v. Phelps, applying the
actual malice standard based less on the identity of the defamed, but more
on the public relevance of the defamatory content.244 Despite that the
plaintiff in Snyder was a private citizen, the court found that Westboro Baptist
Church protesters at his son’s funeral were entitled to “actual malice”
protection because their offensive signs related to matters of public interest.245
The relevance of this latest development is unclear at it pertains to fake news,
which might be distinguished on the basis that it falsely portrays itself as fact,
while Snyder treated politically charged opinion. Fake news presents an
interesting challenge to several aspects of this series of post-Sullivan decisions,
though the gaps ultimately leave the question as to a group libel suit for
enforcement against creators of fake news open.
All of this aside, the “actual malice” standard, conceived in Sullivan partly
as a protective device for suits against publishers, may not be insurmountable
in today’s online news landscape, even if applied. The advertisement at issue
in Sullivan was approved and printed by the New York Times based on the fact
that it was “endorsed by a number of people . . . whose reputation [the Times’
secretary] had no reason to question.”246 Although no attempt was made to
check the accuracy of its assertions,247 this was famously not enough to trigger
the new “actual malice” standard, since the plaintiffs failed to show
knowledge that the statements were false.248 This is a far cry from the state
of mind of the creators and curators of some of the most notoriously viral
fake news stories, many of whom have been open about their falseness and
complete dearth of journalistic rigor.249 Yet, despite these differences, intent
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249

Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 389 U.S. 28 (1967);
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343–44.
485 U.S. 46, 46, 57 (1988).
562 U.S. 443, 453–55 (2011).
Id.
KERMIT HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: CIVIL RIGHTS, LIBEL LAW
AND THE FREE PRESS 17 (2011).
Id.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286 (1964).
Jestin Coler, publisher of the infamous fake news report about the murder of an FBI agent who
leaked Clinton emails was killed (which got 1.6 million views) says stories like this work because they
“fit into existing right-wing conspiracy theories . . . . Everything about it was fictional: the town, the
people, the sheriff, the FBI guy. And then . . . our social media guys kind of go out and do a little

1344

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:5

is a slippery element to prove in a courtroom, and the cost to a legitimate
news organization would be devastating were a plaintiff to succeed despite
the application of the heightened standard.250
At the surface, the Sullivan line of cases may have minimized the ability of
any particular public official to bring criminal or civil libel claims against
news media organizations covering civil rights movements. However, this
would not prevent group libel from being used as a government-wielded
bludgeon against anti-racist or anti-fascist groups today. Such a suit would
merely require a complainant by any other name. Fear of any criminal libel
law in the hands of the government stems from a broader fear than the
acknowledgement of a government’s inability to withstand criticism that
underlies Sullivan. In addition to protecting itself through censorship, the
government as an entity (rather than an individual) could equally act as a
harbinger of hate if given prosecutorial power over which groups in society
require the protection of the law.
This is partly to blame on the fact that oppression and defamation are
readily reversible before the law. In Sullivan, it was asserted that the
advertisement published by the Times “echoed prevailing stereotypes of the
South as a racist, backward, and violent place,”251 and while the plaintiffs in
the case were indeed individual public officials, the advertisement was
equally viewed as a defamation of all citizens of Alabama.252 Furthermore,
comparing these sentiments to the polarization of America today is only
facilitated by the fact that the players are nearly the same as they were half a
century ago. The New York Times, as a publication, continues to irritate
conservative groups, and has been attacked widely on the right for failing to
remain “neutral” in its coverage of partisan issues.253 Conservative journalist
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252
253

dropping it throughout Trump groups and Trump forums and boy it spread like wildfire.” All Tech
Considered: We Tracked Down A Fake-News Creator In The Suburbs. Here’s What We Learned, NPR (Nov.
23, 2016) (downloaded from npr.org). There are complications to this application and a potential
parody defense, for example, Hustler raises the issue of news that is so obviously fake that a
reasonable person would recognize it as fake. The Supreme Court noted that this type of flexibility
would be necessary to prevent enforcement against purveyors of political cartoons. Hustler v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988).
The ultimate question in civil cases becomes one of probability, luck and financing. After Gertz,
private plaintiffs need to show actual malice to receive punitive damages, and without financing or
evidence of actual malice, litigation might prove to be too costly. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 339 (1974). Meanwhile, a wealthy plaintiff with unlimited resources could have more
leeway to litigate against an organization that he or she disliked. Expanding civil libel doctrine
would only further exacerbate these effects.
HALL, supra note 246, at 21–22.
Schmidt, supra note 230, at 317.
Joel B. Pollack, James O’Keefe Busts New York Times Editor Explaining How Paper Sets Anti-Trump Narrative,
BREITBART
NEWS
(Oct.
17,
2017),
http://www.breitbart.com/bigjournalism/2017/10/17/james-okeefe-new-york-times-shoe-narrative/.
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James O’Keefe’s “Project Veritas” has made it its mission to catch the
publication in inaccuracies or prejudices. As an example, the project
procured and released a “bust” video showing a Times editor explaining the
difficulty in portraying the President in an unbiased light.254
There are non-political examples of libel law’s double-sided nature as an
instrument of social justice, as well, which reveal how dangerous a criminal
group libel law might be in unintended hands. In August of 2017, a
conservative Christian media group, D. James Kennedy Ministries, filed a
defamation lawsuit in Alabama against the Southern Poverty Law Center
over “false and misleading descriptions of its services” published online.255
The progressive legal group had implied that D. James Kennedy Ministries
was a hate group because of its extreme anti-LGBT rhetoric.256 This reality
ultimately demonstrates that the Madisonian conception of democratic
governance may only treat one form of government mistrust, beyond its
tendency to control speech for self-perpetuation. Rather, it is a different form
of mistrust—the recognition that government officials are human and thus
equally susceptible to bias and misinformation—that would render group
libel an ineffectual solution to non-political fake news.
Finally, as would be the case with nearly any criminal law involving
speech, the chilling effects associated with a resuscitation of Beauharnais today
would be a hidden but profound cost to bear. It is easier to answer questions
about the constitutionality and functionality of a group libel solution to fake
news than to predict how the public would understand a law that appears to
regulate offense and bias. Real and disputed issues touching on ethnicity,
race, and religion need the sanitizing effects of discussion, perhaps even more
so than any other, given their sensitivity. It is possible that even a narrowly
tailored group libel law might suffice to create a perceived ban on offense,
and accidentally deter this ever-important discourse.
Yet, in application, it is unclear where, how, or to what degree chilling
effects should figure into a First Amendment analysis, given their ephemeral
nature.257 Put simply, “[t]he chilling effect doctrine recognizes the fact that
254
255
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Id.
Valerie Richardson, Christian Ministry Sues over Listing on Southern Poverty Law’s ‘Hate Map,’ WASH.
TIMES (Aug 23, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/aug/23/southernpoverty-law-center-hit-with-defamation-la/.
Anti-LGBT, SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremistfiles/ideology/anti-lgbt (last visited May 1, 2019) (“Anti-LGBT groups on the SPLC hate list often
link homosexuality to pedophilia, claim that same-sex marriage and LGBT people in general are
dangers to children, that homosexuality itself is dangerous, support the criminalization of
homosexuality and transgender identity, and that there is a conspiracy called the ‘homosexual
agenda’ at work that seeks to destroy Christianity and the whole of society.”).
As mentioned earlier, the Alvarez majority briefly alludes to arguments that avoidance of chilling
effects might be a “value” to be considered in its calculation of whether to extend protection to
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the legal system is imperfect and mandates the formulation of legal rules that
reflect our preference for errors made in favor of free speech.”258 Of course,
this brings the analysis back to where it started, with calculation of value to
harm and an open directive to protect the freedom of the internet because
we have never known it any other way.259
CONCLUSION
As the Packingham majority fervently acknowledged, the unregulated and
decentralized environment that incubated social media has been hailed as a
reason behind its success as a universally dominant news platform.260 Yet,
this same environment can also be blamed for its corruptibility as a
communicative tool.261 The American public’s failure to anticipate or detect
fake news online is evidence that, especially where money is to be made,
technology evolves at a faster rate than human psychology and sociology.
Previous campaigns to develop an informed citizenry in the face of
technologically accelerated misinformation, like the “Public Interest
Theory,” reflected a quest to institutionalize the ideals put forth in First
Amendment values like democratic discourse and the marketplace of ideas.
“During the 1940s and 1950s, educators and researchers devoted
considerable attention to developing thinking skills within the general
public,” through propaganda awareness groups, literary and debating
societies, and even regulatory schemes like the fairness doctrine.262
Meanwhile, despite rising public concern about fake news today,
Americans have yet to even agree on the precise nature of the problem.263
In absence of organic cultural change, the question of government
intervention has become a hot topic for debate. Although an active solution
like group libel has been proposed and rejected here as an inappropriate
remedy for defamatory non-political fake news, more passive alternatives like
inoculation and tolerance seem equally unrealistic in the face of growing
mistrust of fact-based reasoning as a whole.
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260
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those statements. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012). It is unclear the extent to
which the Court relied on this value in its analysis, though it did not outright reject the Respondent’s
suggestion. Id.
Frederick Schauer, Fear Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685,
688 (1978).
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017).
ADAM KLEIN, FANATICISM, RACISM AND RAGE ONLINE: CORRUPTING THE DIGITAL SPHERE 44
(2017).
Id.
Jack Kay, George W. Ziegelmueller & Kevin M. Minch, From Coughlin to Contemporary Talk Radio:
Fallacies & Propaganda in American Populist Radio, 5 J. RADIO STUD. 9, 19 (1998).
FINKEL ET AL., supra note 56, at 10.
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Part of this problem may be one of linguistics: the term “fake news”
covers a broad range of journalistic forms, from the clickbait and reckless
unverified reporting that have primarily been the subject of this inquiry, to
the more ubiquitous category of news that President Donald Trump does not
like.264 As a consequence, the term “fake news” is now wielded globally by
authoritarian rulers seeking to undermine trust in all institutions, but
particularly any media that contradicts them.265 This analysis has explored
how government mistrust should be a warning bell for any criminal censorial
power, particularly in an already polarized society.
The problem is larger than an attempt to crush criticism, however.
Embedded in the Trump Administration’s campaign to erode faith in
“mainstream media,” conflation of any and all critical content with “fake
news,” is a call to retreat from Madisonian democratic ideals and Holmes’
marketplace of ideas altogether.266 Arguments about the merits of a
government-administered solution to fake news versus a citizen-administered
one seem futile in this context, where truth is altogether irrelevant.267
Furthermore, the foundational principles of free speech in America are
perhaps too abstract to serve the purposes of already vulnerable ethnic,
racial, and religious groups who face other challenges beyond the daily swell
of defamatory online content from travel bans at the border268 to the threat
of police brutality in their own neighborhoods.269
The First Amendment may overestimate the human capacity to resist
clickbait that promises to soothe deep-seated insecurities and peddle in
comforting stereotypes. It may fail to discern that within its aim of
constraining government as a whole, it cannot control for the fallibility of the
individuals who compose it. However, that does not mean that the pursuit
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Id. at 10; Tamara Keith, President Trump’s Description of What’s ‘Fake’ Is Expanding, NPR (Sept. 2, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/09/02/643761979/president-trumps-description-of-whats-fake-isexpanding (noting that even Trump himself has admitted tacitly that his definition of “fake”
includes any negative reporting about himself).
FINKEL ET AL., supra note 56, at 10.
Steven Erlanger, ‘Fake News,’ Trump’s Obsession, Is Now a Cudgel for Strongmen, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/world/europe/trump-fake-newsdictators.html?_r=0.
Amy Wang, ‘Post-truth’ Named 2016 Word of the Year by Oxford Dictionaries, WASH. POST (Nov. 16,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/16/post-truth-named2016-word-of-the-year-by-oxford-dictionaries/?utm_term=.08ae1269b859. (“‘I have never been a
fan of the word ‘post-truth,’ since it’s a facile way to describe basic human behavior since the first
words were spoken,’ The Fact Checker’s Glenn Kessler said in an email. ‘People have always been
swayed by emotions and personal beliefs. As fact checkers, we give people the factual information
and context for statements made by politicians. What people do with those facts is up to them.’”).
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
Cassandra Chaney & Ray V. Robertson, Racism and Police Brutality in America, 17 J. AFR. AM. STUD.
480 (2013) (investigating how the public generally perceive police and how race and racism shape
this discourse).
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of truth is not an intellectual guidepost worth striving for. Particularly if we
cannot rely on the State in this pursuit, we must take it on ourselves as
individual members of diverse, but ever-threatened communities.

